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MASSACHUSETTS  INSTITUTE  OF TECHNOLOGY 
Are  Currency  Crises  Self-Fulfilling? 
1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been a major revival of interest in the modeling 
of currency crises.  This revival has been  driven in large part by events: 
the series of crises that partially wrecked Europe's Exchange Rate Mecha- 
nism  (ERM) in  1992-1993,  and  the  Mexican  crisis of late  1994 and  its 
aftermath. The new  interest has also been driven,  however,  by the excit- 
ing  policy  conclusions  of  new  models,  most  of  them  inspired  by  the 
seminal  paper of Obstfeld  (1994). 
What differentiates  the new  currency-crisis literature from the "classi- 
cal" literature  exemplified  by  Krugman  (1979) and  Flood  and  Garber 
(1984)? One important  difference  is a change  in the macroeconomic  and 
policy  models  that are used  to describe  crisis-prone  countries.  The old 
currency-crisis  models  were  essentially  seignorage-driven:  countries 
were  assumed  to have  an uncontrollable  need  to monetize  their budget 
deficits,  and  to face crisis when  this need  collided  with  the attempt  to 
maintain a fixed exchange  rate. Obstfeld and his followers  have pointed 
out that this is a very poor description of the position of such recent crisis 
countries as Britain and Italy in 1992, and is not even a very good descrip- 
tion of Mexico in 1994. Instead,  the policy dilemmas  facing these  coun- 
tries have  centered  on  such  issues  as real overvaluation,  interest  rates, 
and  unemployment;  rather than  facing  a sharply  defined  reserve  con- 
straint, the governments  that experienced  currency crises were trying to 
make  the  best  of  trade-offs  among  these  objectives,  with  speculators 
attempting  to second-guess  government  intentions  as well  as capabili- 
ties.  Much of the recent theoretical effort has therefore gone  into trying 
to develop  more realistic models  of crisis-prone economies. 
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Most  of the recent papers  have,  however,  argued  that this change  in 
modeling  strategy has consequences  that go beyond  changing  the label- 
ing  of  the  axes  or the  details  of  the  mechanics  of  crisis.  Rather, they 
argue that when  exchange-rate  policy is driven by macroeconomic  trade- 
offs rather than brute monetary concerns,  there is a change in the whole 
logic  of  currency  crises:  instead  of  being  events  that  are in  principle 
predictable,  determined  by  underlying  fundamentals,  such  crises  be- 
come  in large part the result of self-fulfilling  expectations.  As  Obstfeld 
(1995) puts  it, the  "new  generation  of crisis models  suggests  that even 
sustainable  pegs  may  be  attacked  and  even  broken"-that  is,  a fixed 
exchange  rate that could or would  have lasted indefinitely  in the absence 
of a speculative  attack may collapse simply because financial markets are 
persuaded,  perhaps  by  otherwise  irrelevant information,  that the  rate 
will not be sustained. 
Some  authors  have  been  willing  to  draw  strong  policy  implications 
from  this  conclusion.  Most  notably,  Eichengreen,  Rose,  and  Wyplosz 
(1995) have  argued  that  the  possibility  of  self-fulfilling  crises  makes  a 
combination  of fixed  exchange  rates and  free capital mobility  unwork- 
able; they argue that monetary union and/or capital controls are the only 
sustainable  alternatives  to floating.  More generally, if we accept the idea 
that  many  currency  crises  are unjustified  by  fundamentals,  there  is  a 
strong case for reconsidering  the traditional economist's  benign  attitude 
toward financial markets: instead  of regarding speculators  as essentially 
blameless,  mere  messengers  bringing  the  bad  news,  the  new  models 
suggest  that the George  Soroses  of the world may be true villains,  tear- 
ing down  structures that might otherwise  have stood  indefinitely. 
These  are remarkable  conclusions  to  emerge  from  no  more  than  a 
reconsideration  of macroeconomic  modeling  strategy. Can changing  the 
way  we  represent  the government's  objective function  really make this 
much difference? 
In this  paper  I want  to  argue  that  the  answer  is  no-that  the  new 
currency-crisis  models,  while  they  have  made  an important  contribu- 
tion,  do not in general imply as radical a rethinking  of the logic of crisis 
as their creators have  suggested.  More specifically, I will argue that the 
indeterminacy  in the  new  models  does  not arise from the difference  in 
macroeconomic  structure between  these models  and the "classical" crisis 
models.  Instead,  the key change  is in the assumptions  concerning  long- 
run sustainability.  In the classical models,  economists  envisaged  a situa- 
tion in which  underlying  fundamentals  were  persistently  deteriorating 
and  focused  on  the  timing  of  an  eventually  inevitable  collapse.  More 
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fundamentals;  it is this,  not the change  in the definition  of these  funda- 
mentals,  that makes the timing of speculative  attack arbitrary. 
We may  also  argue,  albeit less  strongly,  that in either the classical or 
the  new  crisis  models  the  knowledge  that fundamentals  will  or might 
deteriorate  tends  to  limit  the  possibilities  for  multiple  equilibria- 
specifically,  to narrow and perhaps  eliminate  the gap between  the nec- 
essary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  speculative  attack.  Less  strongly 
still,  we  may  argue  that  large  agents  of  the  George  Soros  type  also 
narrow  this  gap,  tending  to  provoke  crises  as  soon  as  the  necessary 
conditions  are satisfied. 
Finally, this  paper  argues  that the  actual currency experience  of the 
1990s does  not make as strong a case for self-fulfilling crises as has been 
argued by some  researchers.  In general,  it will be very difficult to distin- 
guish  between  crises that need  not have happened  and those  that were 
made  inevitable  by concerns  about future viability that seemed  reason- 
able at the time. 
The remainder  of this paper is in nine sections.  Section 2 offers a brief 
restatement  of  the  "classical" theory  of  currency  crises,  in  a form in- 
tended  to stress some  similarities with the more recent literature. Section 
3 sets out a reduced-form  "new" crisis model,  intended  to represent  the 
large  class  of  such  models  developed  in  the  last  few  years.  Section  4 
examines  what  happens  when  this  model  is  applied  to  an  economy 
experiencing  a secular deterioration in its fundamentals.  Sections 5 and 6 
examine  the  role  of  two  kinds  of  uncertainty-uncertainity  about  the 
government's  determination  to defend  the currency regime,  and uncer- 
tainty about future fundamentals.  Section 7 explores briefly the potential 
role of Soroi-large  agents  who  may be able to provoke  currency crises 
for fun and profit. Section 8 reviews  recent empirical literature, and asks 
to what  extent  the  evidence  really does  indicate  an important  role for 
self-fulfilling  crises.  Section 9 offers a reexamination of the ERM crises of 
1992-1993  in light of the models  presented  in the paper. A final section 
attempts  to summarize  the state of play. 
2.  The  Classical  Crisis  Model 
The classical model  of currency crises may be said to have originated  in 
the work of Salant and Henderson  (1978), who  showed  why  an attempt 
to peg  the price of gold  using  a government-held  stock should  eventu- 
ally end  in a speculative  attack that abruptly wipes  out that stock.  This 
analysis  was directly adapted by Krugman (1979) to the case of a country 
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complications  in that model were removed, and its results greatly clari- 
fied, in later work by Flood and Garber  (1984)  and many others. 
For current  purposes, it will be most useful to state a simple monetary 
model of crises in a way that at least at first  makes it seem as if there were 
multiple equilibria, then see how the standard analysis establishes a 
unique timing for speculative attack. 
Consider, then, a country that is attempting to maintain a fixed ex- 
change rate  against the rest of the world. We  will make strong "monetary 
approach"  assumptions: both full employment and purchasing-power 
parity obtain, and the domestic interest rate equals the foreign rate plus 
expected depreciation. Without loss of whatever generality  remains we 
may take the rest-of-world  price level to be stable at 1, and assume the 
rest-of-world interest rate fixed. The demand for domestic money can 
therefore  be written 
M =  EL(e),  (1) 
where E is the exchange rate (domestic money for foreign), L(-)  the real 
money demand, and e the expected rate of depreciation.  The domestic 
money supply may be written as the sum of domestic credit  and foreign 
exchange reserves: 
M =  D + R.  (2) 
Finally,  we assume that the government is running a budget deficit, 
which it must cover by expanding domestic credit D. As long as it can, 
however, the central  bank will attempt  to peg the exchange rate through 
unsterilized intervention;  when it is no longer able to do so, the continu- 
ing expansion of D will lead to an inflation  rate (and hence depreciation 
rate) Tr. 
Suppose, now, that we were to take a snapshot of this economy at a 
particular  point in time, without trying to track  its future evolution. We 
might well convince ourselves that there are in fact multiple equilibria 
inherent in this situation. Suppose that reserves lies in the range 
O <  R < M -  EL(7r).  (3) 
Then it might seem that the following is true: if the market does not 
expect an immediate collapse of the fixed-rate regime, then the ex- 
pected depreciation rate is zero, and since there are positive reserves, 
the fixed rate is viable. On the other hand, if the market expects the 
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then  money  demand  immediately  falls by more than the reserves  avail- 
able,  so  reserves  are  exhausted  in  a  sudden  speculative  attack.  It 
might  seem,  then,  that  there  is  a range  of  reserve  levels-what  Cole 
and  Kehoe  (1996a,  b)  call  a  "crisis zone"-within  which  speculative 
attacks  can  occur  with  arbitrary timing,  and  constitute  self-fulfilling 
crises. 
This is not,  however,  the way  that such models  are usually  analyzed. 
Why? Because  the multiplicity  of outcomes  can be ruled out through  a 
process  of backward induction. 
Bear in  mind  that  as  described,  the  situation  is  one  in  which  the 
central bank is steadily losing reserves.  Thus if we imagine the fixed rate 
avoiding  any  speculative  attack, it will nonetheless  eventually  collapse 
all the same.  At that point there would  be a discrete drop in the demand 
for money,  as the expected  depreciation  rate rose from 0 to Tr;  since the 
money  supply  would  not  fall (reserves  being  exhausted),  that  would 
mean a step depreciation  of the currency. 
But such  a step  depreciation  would  offer investors  the prospect  of a 
forseeable  capital gain at (in continuous  time) an infinite rate. It would 
therefore  be  in  their  interest  to  shift  out  of  the  currency  a bit before 
reserves  would  be  exhausted-that  is,  to  launch  a  speculative  attack 
when  reserves  fell close  to but not all the way  to zero.  Such an attack 
would,  however,  force a collapse of the fixed exchange rate at this earlier 
date-again  offering a step depreciation of the currency, inducing  inves- 
tors to attack still earlier. One  can work backwards  in this  fashion,  al- 
ways  finding  that  the  speculative  attack must  occur  earlier, until  one 
reaches a level of reserves  so high that it would  not be exhausted  even if 
investors  believed  that  the  exchange  regime  is about to collapse.  This 
critical level of reserves  is defined  by 
R =  EL(O) -  EL(Xr)  =  M-EL(7r).  (4) 
In short, the standard analysis predicts that a currency crisis will occur 
as soon as a speculative  attack  can succeed.  The range of indeterminacy-the 
range over which  an attack would  succeed  if it occurred, but seemingly 
need  not occur-is  eliminated  by reasoning  backward from the known 
eventual  collapse  of the exchange  regime. 
It is important  to realize  what  is meant  here by saying  that multiple 
equilibria are ruled out.  The mechanism  that might  seem  to imply  self- 
fulfilling  crises  is  not  being  questioned:  a speculative  attack triggers  a 
change  in policy that validates  that attack. Nor does the classical analysis 
deny  that there is a "crisis zone,"  a range of reserve levels within which 
such  an attack can take place.  The claim is instead  that one will not see 350 *  KRUGMAN 
countries  with  fixed  exchange  rates living  for extended  periods  inside 
that zone,  because  a crisis will occur as soon  as they enter it.1 
It should  be  immediately  apparent  that  the  elimination  of  multiple 
equilibria in this case has little to do with the way that fundamentals  are 
modeled-with  the "monetary approach" character of the model,  or the 
crude  representation  of the  government  as a mechanism  that pegs  the 
exchange  rate until it literally runs out of money. It is, rather, the assump- 
tion  that  the  fixed  rate is  known  to  be  ultimately  unsustainable  that 
establishes  a unique  relationship  between  fundamentals  and the timing 
of crisis. 
With this  review  of the  classical crisis model,  let us then  turn to the 
"new" approach. 
3.  The  "New"  Crisis  Models 
"New"  models  of currency crises come  in a variety of types,  and differ 
widely  in their details.  Arguably, however,  we  may think of the typical 
model as telling the following  story:2 A government-no  longer a simple 
mechanism  like that in the classical model,  but rather an agent trying to 
minimize  a loss  function-must  decide  whether  or not  to  defend  an 
exogenously  specified  exchange  rate parity. In making  this  decision,  it 
takes three concerns  into account. 
First,  there  is  some  reason  why,  other  things  equal,  the  government 
would  like to have  an exchange-rate  depreciation.  This might involve 
a desire  to reduce  unemployment  when  wages  are sticky in nominal 
terms; or it might  reflect a desire  to reduce  the real value  of a heavy 
domestic  debt burden.  In any case,  there is some  payoff to deprecia- 
tion per se. 
Second,  the cost of remaining  with the fixed exchange  rate is higher, the 
greater the rate of depreciation  that private agents expect.  In practice, 
this cost normally  takes the form of expectations  of depreciation  lead- 
ing  to higher  interest  rates, which  in turn have  adverse  effects either 
1. This distinction  is crucial in assessing  historical experience.  If you conclude  that Britain 
would  not  have  dropped  out  of  the  ERM in  September  1992 had  it not  been  for the 
speculative  attack, this is not evidence  in favor of self-fulfilling  crises-you  would  say 
the same  thing  following  a classical currency crisis whose  timing was  entirely determi- 
nate.  What you  must conclude,  rather, is that a similar attack would  have driven Britain 
out  even  if it had  occurred  several  months  earlier, implying  that Britain had lived  for 
some  length  of time within  the crisis zone. 
2. Some  formal  models  do  not  quite  work  this  way.  Obstfeld  (1995) offers  an  informal 
exposition  that seems  to correspond  quite well  to the  description  here; but his  formal 
model  does  not,  as explained  in footnote  3. Are  Currency  Crises  Self-Fulfilling?  *  351 
on the budget  or on the private economy.3 Regardless of the details,  it 
becomes  more expensive  not to depreciate the more the financial mar- 
kets are convinced  that you will in fact depreciate. 
Third,  and  offsetting  these  concerns,  the  government  is  reluctant  to 
depreciate  for some  reason-typically,  because  it has staked its credi- 
bility on the maintenance  of the current parity, and would  pay a politi- 
cal price  (or find  that inflation-output  trade-offs,  interest  rates,  etc. 
have worsened)  if it abandoned  its peg. 
We may  capture  all of  these  concerns  with  a simple,  reduced-form 
representation  in discrete  time.4 Let e be the logarithm of the exchange 
rate,  with  e* the  rate that the  government  would  choose  if it faced no 
credibility  concerns,  e the  parity to which  it has  staked  its reputation, 
and  E the  expected  rate of  depreciation,  eE -  e. It is  not  necessary  to 
assume  any particular functional  form, but for simplicity let us suppose 
that the government's  loss function  takes the form 
H  =  [a(e* -  e) +  be]2 +  R(Ae),  (5) 
where  R(.) takes  on  the  value  0 if the  government  does  not  allow  the 
exchange  rate to change,  but takes on the value C if it does.  Thus C is a 
fixed "reputation" cost the government  will incur if it abandons its parity. 
Let  us  assume  that  the  government  can  choose  the  exchange  rate 
(implicitly, we may think of this as involving  monetary policy). If the peg 
is to be abandoned,  then the government  may as well go to its otherwise 
preferred exchange  rate e*; once it does  so, the market should not expect 
any further change,  so abandoning  the peg would  eliminate the first two 
terms in (5). If the government  is currently pegging,  on the other hand, 
the market might  expect  either that it will continue  to do so  (eE =  e) or 
that it will  abandon  the  peg  next  period  (eE =  e*). The  decision  about 
whether  to retain the peg  this period will then depend  on the compari- 
son of the loss from staying on the peg with the credibility cost of leaving 
it; that is, on whether 
[a(e* -  e) +  b(eE -  e)]2 >  C.  (6) 
3. Some recent models  do not fit this description.  For example,  in the formal model offered 
in Obstfeld  (1995), past expectations  of depreciation,  as reflected in the predetermined 
current level  of wages,  affect the government's  decision  about whether  to devalue; but 
expectations  of future depreciation  play no role. In this model  one cannot use backward 
induction  to tie down  the timing of crisis, essentially  because nobody  has an incentive  to 
look more than one period ahead.  Thus the approach taken here does not represent the 
full range of recent literature. 
4. The Appendix  offers an illustrative particular model which gives rise to this loss function. 352 *  KRUGMAN 
Suppose  that  the  market  does  not  expect  a depreciation.  Then  the 
second  term in (6) will vanish,  and the government  will want to maintain 
its peg,  fulfilling the market's expectations,  as long as 
[a(e* -  e)]2  <  C.  (7) 
Suppose  on the other hand  that the market does  expect a depreciation. 
Then  the  second  term will  become  positive,  and  the  government  will 
abandon  the peg and once again fulfill expectations  as long as 
[(a +  b)(e* -  e)]2  >  C.  (8) 
Clearly, then,  we have multiple  equilibria as long as 
[a(e* -  e)]2 <  C <  [(a +  b)(e*  -  e)]2.  (9) 
As long as the economy's  parameters put it in that range, either expecta- 
tions  that the  exchange  regime  will  survive  or expectations  that it will 
collapse  will be confirmed by government  action. 
In the next  part I will offer some  reasons  to question  the reasonable- 
ness  of this result. Even before doing so, however,  it may be worthwhile 
pointing  out some  limits to the policy relevance of the analysis. 
Some  discussions  of the implications  of the new  crisis models,  nota- 
bly  Eichengreen,  Rose,  and  Wyplosz  (1995),  seem  to  blur  the  line 
between  the  proposition  that  some potentially  sustainable  fixed-rate 
regimes  can be  overthrown  by  speculative  attack and  the  far stronger 
proposition  that  any fixed-rate  regime  can  be  subject  to  self-fulfilling 
crisis.  It is immediately  apparent  from (9) that this is not the case: self- 
fulfilling  attacks are possible  only  over  a range  of parameters,  not  for 
any  parameters.  Indeed,  even  this  reduced-form  representation  indi- 
cates  loosely  the  conditions  for  a  crisis-proof  fixed  rate: e.g.,  a  high 
cost  to abandoning  the peg  (for example,  a very strong public commit- 
ment),  and of course  a peg  that is not too far from the "right" level  (e* 
close to e). 
One might argue that the actual evidence  shows  that fixed rates have 
collapsed  when  they  were  clearly sustainable.  As  we  will  see  shortly, 
however,  it is substantially  harder to make that case than seems  to have 
been  appreciated. 
First, however,  let us try to draw a parallel between  this "new crisis" 
model  and the classical crisis model  presented  in Section 2. Are  Currency  Crises  Self-Fulfilling?  *  353 
4.  The  Effects  of Deteriorating  Fundamentals 
None  of the recent crisis models  embodies  the element  that was  crucial 
in pinning  down  the timing of crisis in the classical crisis model: a secular 
deterioration  in fundamentals.5  Yet there is nothing  about a more com- 
plex and sophisticated  representation  of the government's  decision prob- 
lem  that precludes  the possibility  that fundamentals  change  over time, 
and may do so predictably. 
Indeed,  it is easy  to think of a number  of realistic ways  in which  the 
fundamentals  of countries  that have  experienced  currency crises in re- 
cent years  have  shown  secular tendencies  toward deterioration.  A par- 
tial list might  include  the  following  (entries are numbered  so that they 
may be referred to later): 
(i)  Persistent  "inertial" inflation at rates greater than trading partners' 
may make a fixed exchange  rate increasingly  overvalued,  increas- 
ing the employment  cost of maintaining  that parity. 
(ii)  Even a constant  unemployment  rate may have growing  social 
costs,  as families run down  their savings,  unemployment  benefits 
are exhausted,  and long-term unemployed  workers are trans- 
formed from employable  "insiders" to unemployable  "outsiders." 
(iii)  External debt may accumulate  due to large current account deficits, 
leading  to questions  about the ability or willingness  of the country 
to honor its obligations  to foreign creditors. 
(iv)  Internal debt may accumulate at an accelerating rate, as interest 
payments  exceed  the primary surplus,  leading to questions  about 
the solvency  of the government. 
(v)  The political position  of the government  may approach a terminal 
condition,  as mandatory  elections  approach or as a parliamentary 
majority is eroded  by resignations,  defections,  and mortality. 
For these  and  other  reasons,  it is reasonable  to suppose  that the pa- 
rameters in the loss  function  (5) will predictably shift over time, just as 
reserves  predictably  decline  in the classical crisis model. 
In general,  any and  all of the parameters might  shift; but for current 
purposes  let us assume  that what  actually shifts is e*, the exchange  rate 
that the government  would  choose  if it were not concerned with credibil- 
ity. And  for the moment  let us  assume  that e* has  predictable upward 
trend. 
5. Cole and  Kehoe  (1996a, b) develop  an infinite-horizon  model  of debt crises (without  a 
currency  component)  in  which  capital and  debt  may  evolve  over  time; however,  the 
equilibria they  study  are all Markov, rather than embodying  any secular trend. 354 *  KRUGMAN 
Suppose  that  the  fixed  exchange  rate is  ultimately  unsustainable- 
that is,  there  is a future  date  T at which  it is known  that e*(T) will  be 
sufficiently  high that the government  would  abandon the fixed rate even 
in the absence  of a speculative  attack. That is, 
[a(e*(T)  -  e)]2 >  C.  (10) 
Then  consider  the  previous  period.  Since investors  know  that the  peg 
will  be  abandoned  in  the  next  period,  they  will  have  an expected  ex- 
change rate e*(T), and the peg will therefore necessarily be abandoned  in 
period  T-  1 if 
[a(e*(T -  1)  -  e) +  b(e*(T) -  e)]2  >  C.  (11) 
We can work backward in this fashion,  and discover that the latest possi- 
ble date for a currency crisis is the first period t for which 
{a[e*(t)  -  e] +  b[e*(t +  1) -  e]}2  >  C.  (12) 
Finally, suppose  that periods  are short compared with the trend in e*, so 
that e* (t  +  1) is close  to e*(t). Then  (12) may be approximated  by  the 
sufficient  criterion for currency crisis 
{(a +  b)[e*(t)  -  e]}2 >  C.  (13) 
Referring back to (9), what  we  therefore  see  is that the gap between 
the necessary  and sufficient conditions  for currency crisis-between  the 
parameter  values  for which  a crisis can happen  and  those  for which  it 
must happen-has  vanished,  and so therefore have the multiple equilib- 
ria. Just as in the "classical" crisis models,  the knowledge  that the fixed 
rate is  ultimately  unsustainable  means  that  a speculative  attack must 
occur at the earliest time at which  it can succeed. 
The recent currency-crisis literature, then,  has been wrong in suggest- 
ing that the  shift from a mechanical  seignorage-and-reserve-exhaustion 
model  of  crisis  to  one  in which  governments  minimize  a realistic loss 
function  is per  se  a source  of multiple  equilibria. As long  as there is a 
secular trend in the  fundamentals  (defined  as fuzzily  as one  likes) that 
must  eventually  make the exchange  rate unsustainable,  the logic of cur- 
rency  crises becomes  a matter of timing,  and multiple  equilibria disap- 
pear as an issue. 
One may, however,  reasonably argue-for  both the new and the classi- 
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speculators.  These  uncertainties  may be of two kinds.  First, the govern- 
ment's  loss  function  must be a matter of conjecture until it is put to the 
test,  at which  point it may turn out that the government  is either less or 
more willing to defend the regime than expected.  Second, the assumption 
that  fundamentals  inexorably  deteriorate  is  too  strong.  Surely  gov- 
ernments  sometimes  reverse policy direction, seemingly  overvalued  cur- 
rencies  begin  to  look  undervalued  with  the  emergence  of new  export 
opportunities  or declines  in world interest rates, or the ability of govern- 
ments  to stay the course  turns out to be greater than anyone  expected. 
How  do these  uncertainties  affect the analysis? 
5.  Uncertainty  about  the Loss  Function6 
During  both  the  European  crises of 1992-1993  and the Latin American 
crises of 1994-1995,  individual  governments  surprised many observers- 
myself  included-who  had misjudged  the depth of their commitment  to 
fixed rates, in both directions.  The speed with which Britain's Chancellor 
of the Exchequer went  from Churchillian rhetoric about defending  ster- 
ling to proclamations  that the devaluation  of the pound  had him singing 
in the bath was  startling; so was the determination  of France to maintain 
the franc fort despite  ever worsening  unemployment  and budget  woes. 
Mexico's unwillingness  during 1994 to match monetary policy to the goal 
of a strong peso  was  surprising; so was the way that Argentina,  despite 
more than 20% unemployment  and a massive banking crisis, held firm to 
its one-for-one  parity between  pesos  and dollars. But such surprises are 
themselves  unsurprising:  the only way for anyone (including the govern- 
ment itself) to be sure about a government's  loss function is to put it to the 
test. 
We may  crudely  represent  this kind  of uncertainty  as follows:  As  in 
the  previous  section,  we  suppose  that  fundamentals  will  predictably 
deteriorate.  However,  the  fixed  cost  C that the  government  perceives 
itself as facing if it abandons  the currency peg is now  uncertain.  With a 
probability p it takes on a low value,  C1;  with a probability 1 -  p takes on 
a higher  value,  C2. 
Using  the logic of the preceding  section of this paper, it is clear that the 
currency must be attacked by the time that the fundamental  e* has dete- 
riorated to the point where 
[(a +  b)(e* -  e)]2  >  C2.  (14) 
6. This  discussion  is  similar  to,  but  somewhat  more  careful  than,  the  discussion  in 
Krugman  (1979) of the  "one-way  option" created when  it is uncertain how  much  of its 
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Will it be attacked earlier? That depends  on whether  (14) is a more or less 
stringent  criterion than the following: 
[(a +  pb)(e* -  e)]2 >  Cl.  (15) 
It could turn out that any level of the fundamental  e* that satisfies (15) 
also  satisfies  (14); this  will  be  true  either  if the  probability  p that  the 
government  is relatively  willing  to cave  is low,  or if the  difference  be- 
tween  C1  and C2  is small. In that case the timing of the speculative  attack 
will be determined  by the  criterion (14). But if (15) implies  a less  strin- 
gent test than (14)-that  is, if it is satisfied for a lower value of e*-then 
as  soon  as  fundamentals  reach  that  level  there  will  necessarily  be  a 
"probing" speculative  attack that tests the government's  resolve. 
To see why,  first consider  the situation one period before the period T 
for which  (14) is satisfied.  If the fixed rate has survived  to that point,  it 
will be known  that it collapses  in the next period; so the expected  rate of 
depreciation  will be 
E =  e*(T) -  e.  (16) 
But if (15) really is a less stringent  condition  than (14), then if the cost to 
abandoning  the  fixed  rate really does  take on its low  value,  given  this 
expected  rate of depreciation  the government  will abandon the fixed rate 
in period  T-  1. 
Now  consider  the situation  in period  T -  2. Investors  know  that the 
government  will  abandon  the  parity in  T -  1 if it has  low  C; so  their 
expected  rate of depreciation  is 
e  =  p[e*(T -  1) -  e].  (17) 
This will,  however,  lead to an abandonment  of the parity in T -  2 if C is 
low  and (15) is satisfied.  We can therefore step back to T -  3 and make 
the same calculation; and so on.  We finally reach the conclusion  that an 
attack must  occur as soon  as (15) is satisfied; at that point  the expected 
rate of depreciation  will shoot  up to p(e* -  e). 
The attack need  not succeed.  If the government  really does turn out to 
have a high subjective  cost to abandoning  the parity, it will demonstrate 
that by defending  the fixed rate despite  the need  to do so by imposing 
higher interest rates; once the demonstration  has been made,  the expec- 
tation of devaluation  will vanish  for a time,  until fundamentals  deterio- 
rate  to  the  point  at which  a second,  more  decisive  speculative  attack 
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Could an attack occur even  earlier? No: by construction,  if the govern- 
ment  has  a high  C, such  an attack will  fail even  if investors  are com- 
pletely  convinced  that it will succeed; so even a speculative  attack driven 
by the false belief that the exchange  regime must collapse will generate a 
true  expected  rate  of  depreciation  of  only  p(e* -  e),  which  again  by 
construction  is insufficient  to lead to abandonment  of the parity, even  if 
C is low. 
In short, uncertainty  about the government's  loss function does not in 
itself generate any indeterminacy  about the timing of speculative attacks. 
Instead, it creates a pattern of "probing" attacks at determinate times that 
test the government's  willingness  to defend the currency, then recede if it 
proves  indeed  to be willing  to pay the price of sustaining  the fixed rate. 
(Notice  that  the  market  is  not  deliberately  trying  to  elicit information 
about the government's  loss function-this  behavior is a consequence  of 
individual  and indeed  atomistic efforts to maximize profits.) 
This  analysis  suggests  that one  needs  to be very  careful in drawing 
loose  conclusions  from historical episodes  of speculative  attack, bearing 
in mind that such episodes  themselves  elicit information that we have in 
hindsight  but that markets did not have  ex ante.  On one  side,  we  may 
look at the  collapse  of sterling's  ERM parity and conclude,  as Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1995) do, that "the speculative  attack on the British pound in 
September  1992 would  certainly have  succeeded  had it occurred in Au- 
gust." What do we mean by this? Given that we now know that Norman 
Lamont's rhetoric about defending  the pound  was largely bluff, we  can 
conclude  that if speculators  had  decided  with certainty in August  1992 
that sterling  would  drop  out of the ERM, that expectation  would  have 
been  validated; but speculators  did not know  then what we know  now. 
Consider,  in particular, the contrary example  of Sweden,  which  offers 
a clear example  of the case of probing attacks. Sweden  allowed  the krona 
to float on November  19, 1992 in the face of a speculative  attack. Looking 
at that  decision,  and  at the  subsequent  large depreciation  against  the 
DM,  one  might  be tempted  to conclude,  just as in the case of sterling, 
that  the  attack  that  pushed  the  krona  off  its  peg  would  surely  have 
succeeded  had it taken place a month  or two earlier. Figure 1, however, 
shows  the marginal rate charged by the Swedish  central bank-a  useful 
indicator of monetary policy-from  August  through November  1992. As 
we can see,  in fact there was an earlier attack on the krona, in September 
following  the  sterling  crisis-an  attack that  failed  when  the  Swedish 
government  proved ready to defend  the currency with very high interest 
rates.  Might  not  the  same  have  happened  to  an  attack on  sterling  in 
August? 
Conversely,  it is  tempting  to look  at speculative  attacks that failed- 358 *  KRUGMAN 
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such  as the  tequila  effect  that shook  Argentina  but in the  end  did  not 
push  the peso  off its parity-as  evidence  of irrational or herding behav- 
ior by the markets; but the markets did not know  how  much the Argen- 
tine government  was  willing  to endure  to preserve  the parity, and such 
probing  speculative  attacks  may  be  both  rational  and  determinate  in 
their timing when  the government's  objectives are uncertain. 
Does  this mean  that uncertainty  offers no reason to resurrect the idea 
of  self-fulfilling  crises?  No;  a  different  kind  of  uncertainty  may  once 
again create a gap between  necessary and sufficient conditions  for specu- 
lative attack. 
6.  Uncertain  Future  Fundamentals 
The problem of modeling  currency crisis when  the fundamentals  evolve 
according  to a random  process  is not  exactly a new  one; precisely  that 
issue underlay  the literature on the so-called "gold-standard paradox," a 
subset  of the immense  literature on target zones  (see  Buiter and  Grilli, 
1992; Krugman and Rotemberg,  1992). To the extent that this literature, 
which  made use  of the simple reserve-exhaustion  model of crisis, found 
a resolution  for this paradox-a  very limited resolution  at best-it  did so 
by placing restrictions on the postcrisis regime that restored the presump- 
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to see how  a comparable resolution  can be achieved  using  the new  crisis 
models.  The approach  described  here is far from satisfactory, but it may 
offer  a  useful  preliminary  view.  It  suggests  a  plausible  answer:  that 
whereas  a certain eventual  unsustainability  of a fixed rate eliminates  the 
range  of  multiple  equilibria,  a  merely  possible unsustainability  simply 
narrows it. 
Let us maintain the basic reduced-form  model of the decision  whether 
to remain on a currency peg,  as well as the assumption  that evolution  of 
the fundamentals  over time can be represented  by drift in the "otherwise 
desirable" exchange  rate e*. Now,  however,  we  suppose  that e* evolves 
randomly.  Specifically,  we  imagine  that  e* can  only  take  on  one  of  a 
number of discrete possible  values,  indexed  by j; let a superscript repre- 
sent  this  "step" in the ladder of possible  values,  so that e* can take on 
values  e', e2, etc. (It is not necessary  to assume  that the distance between 
steps  is constant.)  And  we  suppose  that at each step there are (possibly 
step-dependent)  probabilities  of  transition  to  neighboring  steps:  from 
e* =  e', there is a probability pj that next period e* =  ei'l,  a probability 
1 -  pj that next period e* = e'-1. 
Given  the uncertain  future evolution  of e*, we  can no longer  use  the 
device  of backward  induction  to find the latest possible  point  at which 
the fixed rate must  collapse.  But we can carry out a corresponding  exer- 
cise in the  space  of fundamentals,  trying to determine  the least favorable 
fundamentals under which the  fixed rate need not collapse. 
Suppose  that there  is a level  of the fundamentals-call  it level J-at 
which  the government  would  abandon  the fixed rate even  if there were 
no speculative  attack. That is, 
[a(e' -  e)]2  >  C.  (18) 
Now  consider  the next worst  possible  level of fundamentals.  Is it possi- 
ble for the exchange  rate to remain fixed at that level? The market knows 
that  if  fundamentals  should  worsen,  the  regime  will  collapse,  so  the 
most favorable expected  exchange  rate is 
eE =  p  ejleI  +  (1  -  p  1)e.  (19) 
Thus the rate would  necessarily  collapse  at this level of e* as long as 
{a(e-1  -  e) +  b[p_,(ej -  e)]}2  >  C.  (20) 
If this condition  is satisfied,  one can work back to the next worst level of 
fundamentals,  and so on. The conclusion,  then,  is that a sufficient  condi- 360 *  KRUGMAN 
tion  for  currency  crisis  is  that  fundamentals  have  deteriorated  to  the 
lowest  level j for which 
[a(ei -  e) + bpj(eji+  -  e)]2 >  C.  (21) 
Once  again,  we  can  think  of  the  discrete  steps  as being  small,  and 
approximate  this criterion as 
[(a + pb)(e* -  e)]2 >  C.  (22) 
The  gap  between  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for currency 
crisis-the  range  over  which  self-fulfilling  attacks become  an  issue- 
may therefore be written as 
[(a +  pb)(e* -  e)]2  <  C <  [(a +  b)(e* -  )]2.  (23) 
The size  of this range depends  on p, which  may be interpreted as the 
probability that fundamentals  will worsen in the immediate future. If p is 
zero-that  is,  there  is  no  possibility  at  all  that  fundamentals  will 
worsen-then  (23) reduces  to  (9).  The  simple  models  that  have  been 
used  to argue for the prevalence  of self-fulfilling prophecies  may thus be 
thought  of as corresponding  to an absence of any concerns about poten- 
tial future unsustainability.  On the other hand,  with  p equal to one-a 
wholly  predictable deterioration in fundamentals-the  model reduces to 
that of Section  4, with  crisis necessarily  occurring at the most favorable 
level  of fundamentals  at which  a speculative  attack could  succeed,  and 
thus with  no range of indeterminacy. 
It may  be  useful  to  take advantage  of  the  functional  form assumed 
here to rewrite the condition  still further. Let emax  be the level  of funda- 
mentals at which  the fixed rate would  be abandoned  even in the absence 
of a speculative  attack, defined  implicitly by 
[a(eax -  e)]2 = C.  (24) 
And  let  emin  be  the  most  favorable  level  of  fundamentals  for which  a 
speculative  attack would  in fact succeed: 
[(a +  b)(emin  -  e)]2 =  C.  (25) 
Then it is straightforward  to show  that the worst  fundamentals  consis- 
tent with  the absence  of a speculative  attack are 
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Again,  if fundamentals  are certain to deteriorate, an attack must occur as 
soon  as it can succeed. 
Introducing  uncertainty  in this way  cuts both ways  if one is debating 
the relevance  of self-fulfilling  crises.  On one side,  it appears that uncer- 
tainty-the  possibility  that the fixed rate might be sustainable  forever- 
allows us to recover the idea that there is a range of parameters for which 
speculative  attack might but need not occur, and in which crises can there- 
fore be self-fulfilling.  On the other hand, the possibility of deterioration in 
the  fundamentals  narrows  that  range.  Nor  is  it necessary  for private 
agents  to expect that fundamentals  will deteriorate: even if the expected 
direction of change  is favorable, the possibility of movement  in the other 
direction limits the range over which  a fixed rate can be maintained. 
7.  Soroi 
Suppose  that due to uncertainty about the future course of fundamentals 
there  exists  a substantial  range  of  fundamentals  over  which  currency 
crisis  could  but  need  not  occur.  This  would  appear  to  offer  a  profit 
opportunity  to  a  sufficiently  large  investor.  All  that  such  an  investor 
need  do is take a short position  in assets  denominated  in the potential 
crisis currency, and then  take the necessary  steps  to provoke  the poten- 
tial crisis. Nice work if you can get it. 
This presumes,  of course,  that a sufficiently  large investor  can in fact 
induce  a self-fulfilling  crisis. There is a straightforward manner in which 
this could happen,  and then a more diffuse  set of possibilities  which  are 
hard to pin down. 
The relatively  straightforward  way  in which  a large investor  can pro- 
voke  a crisis is by the direct effect of his sales.  Let us modify  the model 
slightly.  Suppose  that we  make it explicit that the adverse  effect of ex- 
pected  depreciation  on  the  government's  loss  function  arises  via  the 
domestic  interest  rate; e.g.,  we might write 
H  =  a(e* -  e)2  +  b(i -  i*)2 +  C,  (27) 
where  i is the domestic  interest rate and i* the foreign rate. And suppose 
also that assets denominated  in domestic currency are regarded by inves- 
tors as imperfect  substitutes  for those  denominated  in foreign currency. 
Then let A be the net  stock of such assets  outstanding;  the demand  for 
such  assets  may, crudely, be considered  to depend,  other things  equal, 
on the difference  in expected  yields: 
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Now  suppose  that a large investor  is in a position  to sell a significant 
quantity  S of  domestic-currency-denominated  assets  short,  raising  the 
effective  supply  of such  assets  to A +  S. Clearly, this will raise i for any 
given  E, and thus raise the cost to the government,  other things equal, of 
maintaining  the fixed-rate regime.  By the logic of the process  described 
in  Section  6 above,  this  will  provoke  a  crisis  earlier-or,  to  be  more 
precise,  at a more  favorable level  of fundamentals-than  would  other- 
wise  be the case. 
As an empirical matter, one may question the importance of this mecha- 
nism.  What a large speculator  is doing  in this case is, in effect, a private 
sterilized intervention  against a currency. Most empirical estimates of the 
substitutability  between  assets  denominated  in different currencies sug- 
gest, however,  that only a very large sterilized intervention-one  beyond 
the  resources  even  of  a George  Soros-would  be  necessary  to have  a 
significant impact on the domestic interest rate. Also, governments  them- 
selves  have  the resources  to undertake far larger sterilized interventions 
in defense  of their currencies.  So one might discount  this potential chan- 
nel for influence  of large agents. 
Even  so,  there might  still be a powerful  role. Consider  that the logic 
of  self-fulfilling  crises  implies  that  such  crises  can  be  set  off  by 
"sunspots"-more  or  less  irrelevant  events  that  for whatever  reason 
are taken by private agents  as a signal that the currency regime is about 
to collapse.  Clearly, there is an incentive  for a large agent first to take a 
short position  in a currency, then manufacture  a sunspot,  if only he can 
figure out how. 
In fact, this might not be very hard. What is a better sunspot  than the 
very fact that a large agent  who  is known  for doing  this sort of thing is 
selling  a currency? The beauty of this scheme  is that market participants 
need  not  believe  that the  large agent  has better information  than  they 
do,  nor need  they  even  believe  that other  participants believe  that he 
does;  all that is necessary  is that sufficiently  many  agents  believe  that 
sufficiently  many  other agents  believe  that sales by George Soros will in 
fact provoke  a crisis. 
The  possibility  of  such  "internalization"  of  the  potential  for  crisis 
means  that one may argue loosely  that large agents will narrow the gap 
between  necessary  and sufficient conditions  for crisis. Once the possibil- 
ity of a self-fulfilling  crisis emerges,  so does the possibility  of a profitable 
sunspot-manufacture  scheme;  so  large  agents  will  at least  sometimes 
provoke crises at more favorable fundamentals  than the worst consistent 
with  maintenance  of  a fixed-rate  regime.  Indeed,  if one  regards  such 
agents  as highly  effective,  then  even  in the presence  of uncertainty  the 
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soon  as  a speculative  attack is  possible,  a large  speculator  will  take a 
position  and then create one. 
A final subtlety: as long as market participants believe  that large actors 
will play this role, it may be unnecessary  for them actually to do so. As 
soon  as  the  fundamentals  enter  the  range  in  which  an  attack  could 
succeed,  investors  will reason that the exchange rate is due for imminent 
collapse  through  the  action  of  large  agents,  and  they  will  therefore 
launch a speculative  attack immediately. 
This is a very incomplete  analysis  of the role of large agents; indeed,  a 
complete  model  would  involve  many of the same issues  that arise in the 
analysis of corporate takeovers.  [In particular, the Grossman-Hart  (1981) 
problem  emerges:  if everyone  knows  that George  Soros can provoke  a 
crisis, how  can he make any profits? Currency noise traders?7]  However, 
it  does  suggest  that  the  role  of  large  traders  further  limits  the  likely 
practical  importance  of  multiple  equilibria in  the  genesis  of  currency 
crises. 
A further point  may be worth  making.  There is an ancient  tradition 
among  government  officials in countries  subjected  to speculative  attack 
of blaming  such attacks on nefarious  forces-gnomes  of Zurich, Anglo- 
Saxon enemies  of Europe, and so on. There is an almost equally ancient 
tradition  among  economists  of debunking  such  complaints.  If we  take 
the  self-fulfilling  crisis story seriously,  however,  we  must  also concede 
that the officials have  a point: to the extent that sunspots  may provoke 
an otherwise  unnecessary  crisis, then it makes  sense  to discourage  and 
possibly  even  prosecute  individuals  who  deliberately manufacture  such 
sunspots. 
8.  Empirical  Evidence  on the  Nature  of Crises 
As indicated  in the introduction,  the new  currency-crisis literature was 
largely inspired by recent events,  especially  the ERM crises of 1992-1993; 
more than anything  else,  the informal observation that these crises could 
not  be  easily  described  as driven  by concerns  over  seignorage  and  re- 
serve levels  led to the emergence  of a new  style of model.  I will turn to 
the interpretation  of the ERM crises in the next section.  There is,  how- 
ever, a small, more formal empirical literature which  Obstfeld (1995) and 
Obstfeld  and Rogoff (1995) at least interpret as favorable to the case for 
self-fulfilling  crisis. 
The  most  extensive  recent  empirical investigations  of speculative  at- 
tacks have  been  carried out by Eichengreen,  Rose,  and Wyplosz  (1995). 
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At the risk of oversimplifying  their results,  one might  summarize  them 
as containing  three main stylized  facts: 
1.  While many crises are associated  with the kinds of evidence  that one 
might expect from "classical" crisis models-large  budget deficits, ex- 
cessive  domestic  credit creation,  and also poor trade performance- 
many others,  and especially  the ERM crises, are not. 
2.  In those  crises  that are not  associated  with  easily  measured  policy 
problems  in the runup to crisis, there is generally also an absence  of 
measurable  policy deterioration after the crisis; i.e.,  governments  did 
not ex post  (at least given  the 8-quarter horizon used in Eichengreen, 
Rose,  and Wyplosz's  study)  act in a way  that appeared  to ratify the 
attack. Again,  there was a particular lack of ex post justification in the 
ERM crises. 
3.  Finally, those  crises  that had  few  obvious  explanatory  causes  were 
also  largely  unanticipated  by  the  financial  markets-that  is,  they 
were  not  preceded  by  an  increase  in  interest  premia  on  securities 
denominated  in  those  countries'  currencies.  Rose  and  Svensson 
(1994) have  shown  in  the  particular case  of  the  ERM that  there  is 
hardly any visible deterioration in credibility before August  1992. 
These  are  clearly  very  useful  observations.  But  do  they  constitute 
evidence  on behalf of the importance of self-fulfilling crises? 
Observation  1-that  the data do not appear consistent  with  classical 
crisis  models-suggests  that the  new  crisis models,  in which  govern- 
ments  are concerned  with  macroeconomic  trade-offs rather than a me- 
chanical reserve constraint,  are indeed  a better approach for many of the 
currency crises of recent years.  But does  this indicate that self-fulfilling 
crises are important? Only if you believe that the shift from a seignorage- 
and-reserve  account of crisis to a macroeconomics-and-loss-function  ap- 
proach  is  in  itself  a reason  to  believe  in  multiple  equilibria.  We have 
seen,  however,  that this need  not be the case: the reason why  multiple 
equilibria were absent in the classical crisis models  was not the monetary 
character of the crisis but the assumption  that fundamentals  would  pre- 
dictably deteriorate,  and the reason they are present in many of the new 
models  is the tacit assumption  that there is no such predictable deteriora- 
tion. In short, observation  1 tells us what sort of model is appropriate but 
gives  little indication  of whether  crises are self-fulfilling. 
Observation  2-that  it is hard to find postcrisis changes  in policy that 
ratify speculative  attacks-may  perhaps provide  some evidence  in favor 
of self-fulfilling  crises, in the sense  that the opposite  finding might have 
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ment  policy. Once  one  thinks  carefully about this evidence,  however,  it 
becomes  much less clear how  to interpret this negative  finding. 
Bear in  mind  that  even  in  those  new  crisis  models  that  suggest  a 
strong  possibility  for self-fulfilling  crisis,  policy  variables are supposed 
to be endogenous-in  fact, multiple  equilibria arise precisely  because  a 
speculative  attack may induce  a government  to change its policy. So the 
absence  of  any  clear-cut  changes  in  policy  following  crisis  is,  strictly 
speaking,  evidence  not only  against models  without  multiple  equilibria 
but also against models  with them.  Or perhaps it would  be better to say 
that this  evidence  amounts  to a demonstration  of the weakness  of our 
measures  of economic  policy: that it simply shows  the poor quality of the 
data. 
An alternative interpretation of the evidence  in Eichengreen,  Rose, and 
Wyplosz  is that what  they  are measuring  is changes  in fundamentals- 
the equivalent  of the changes  in e* in the theoretical discussion  above.  In 
that case the absence of a clearly defined deterioration in these fundamen- 
tals is evidence  against any underlying  reason for the currency crises. But 
this interpretation runs into both practical and conceptual difficulties. At a 
practical level,  one  may question  whether  any of the quantitative  mea- 
sures  available  is a good  proxy for the true fundamentals  implied  by a 
realistic model  of the decision  whether  to defend  a fixed rate: since the 
decision  is essentially  political, it is likely to be influenced  strongly by the 
exhaustion  of hard-to-measure  reserves  of public patience  and political 
capital rather than tangible measures  like financial reserves.  At a concep- 
tual level,  one  might  remark that one  main point  of the  classical crisis 
models  was  that an abrupt speculative  attack need  have no obvious  ex- 
planatory  event: reserves  simply needed  to fall to a certain critical level, 
which might be very hard to determine in advance.  Similarly, in new crisis 
models a gradual deterioration in (already hard to measure) fundamentals 
should  eventually  push  the  economy  to a critical point  at which  crisis 
occurs; one  should  not expect  to be able to spot any break in the trend. 
This  leaves  Observation  3,  that  the  ERM crises  (and,  to  a  lesser 
extent,  the Mexican crisis) seem  to have come out of a clear blue sky, in 
the  sense  that there  was  little sign  of a loss  of credibility until  shortly 
before  the  speculative  attacks. It seems  to be widely  accepted  that this 
supports  the idea that the crises were  self-fulfilling  rather than justified 
by  fundamentals-that  the  absence  of  a loss  of credibility in financial 
markets indicates  that there was  no reason  why  the currencies in ques- 
tion needed  to be attacked.  However,  on reflection this is not that easy 
a case to make: if a currency is known  to be vulnerable  to self-fulfilling 
speculative  attacks,  which  will  lead if successful  to a discrete  devalua- 
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expectations  even  in  advance  of  any  actual  attack.  Even  if  an  attack 
need  not happen,  markets should  reflect the possibility  that it might.  In 
this sense,  the absence  of any early warning  from the financial markets 
about  recent  currency  crises  is  as  puzzling  for  advocates  of  self- 
fulfilling-crisis  stories as for anyone  else. 
Recently Obstfeld (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) have made an 
ingenious  if sketchy case for regarding the apparent surprise character of 
recent  crises  as  evidence  in  favor  of  multiple-equilibrium  stories.  The 
argument runs as follows:  sudden  speculative  attacks have led in a num- 
ber of cases to large depreciations,  which would  have offered large profit 
opportunities  to anyone  who  had foreseen  them.  Since these opportuni- 
ties  were  not  reflected  in interest  premia,  the depreciations  must  have 
been  regarded  ex ante as events  that were of low probability. And if we 
assume  rational expectations,  they must truly have been of low probabil- 
ity given  the information  available to markets. But where were the large 
surprise  shocks  to the underlying  economic  environment  facing or poli- 
cies carried out by the crisis countries? Obstfeld and Rogoff argue that it 
is implausible  to suppose  that there were  surprise  shocks  of sufficient 
magnitude.  If, however,  one  attributes  the  crises  to  sunspots-events 
that simply happen  to trigger self-fulfilling  speculative  attack-one  need 
not  look  for large changes  in the environment.  And  one  is also free to 
suppose  that such sunspots  are rare enough  that markets rationally gave 
them little weight  in advance. 
It is an ingenious  argument,  but how  convincing  is it? Notice  that it 
relies on two ancillary assumptions  beyond  the self-fulfilling crisis mod- 
els  themselves:  the  assertion  that sunspots  that trigger crises are rare, 
and the assumption  of rational expectations  on the part of the market. It 
is unclear  why  the  former should  be  the  case  (especially  if we  bear in 
mind the discussion  of large agents and their incentives,  above); it is also 
true that an overwhelming  array of direct evidence  suggests  that foreign- 
exchange  markets  do  not make  use  of  all  available  information.  The 
apparent  failure of the  markets to assign  any substantial  probability to 
either  the  ERM or Mexican  crises  is  indeed  a puzzle,  as  discussed  at 
greater length  below;  but it is far from clear that a low-probability  sun- 
spot story is the right way  to resolve  this puzzle. 
The other  obvious  point  to make is that both the ERM crises and the 
Mexican  crisis  were  preceded  by  surprise  political developments  that 
came as a severe  jolt to financial markets,  not so much because  of their 
direct impact as because  of the revelation  that the political basis for the 
currency regime  was less solid than they had imagined.  The era of crisis 
in the ERM began  with  two shocking  referendum  results on Maastricht: 
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France's  referendum.  These  votes  revealed,  to  most  observers'  great 
surprise,  that the enthusiasm  of Europe's policy elite for EMU was  not 
shared  by  the  broader  public;  they  may  thus  be  regarded  as  "large" 
events  despite  the fact that Danish EMU advocates were able to call for a 
replay  and  French  advocates  technically  won.  In Mexico,  the  Chiapas 
uprising  and  Colosio's  assassination  revealed  a troubled political scene 
that, once again,  was news  to the financial markets (even if they should 
have known  better). 
The available  evidence,  then,  does  not  establish  an overwhelmingly 
compelling  case for the importance  of self-fulfilling  expectations  in cur- 
rency crises. 
9.  The  ERM Crises  of 1992-1993 
There is no obvious  way to test directly whether  any particular currency 
crisis was  a necessary  event  given  expectations  about fundamentals,  or 
simply  a self-fulfilling  event  triggered by a sunspot.  It is possible,  how- 
ever, to ask whether  at the time of a crisis the crisis country was experi- 
encing  a secular deterioration  in fundamentals  which,  like the gradual 
erosion  of reserves  in  the  runup  to  "classical" crises,  could  have  been 
pushing  it toward  a critical point.  If not-if  it is hard to see any reason 
why  markets might  have  concluded  that the exchange  regime was  ulti- 
mately unsustainable-then  one may be strongly inclined to turn to self- 
fulfilling-crisis  stories.  On  the  other  hand,  if there  is  a clearly visible 
deteriorating  trend,  the advocate  of self-fulfilling-crisis  models  is placed 
in  the  much  weaker  position  of arguing  that even  though  there  is an 
explanation  of  the  crisis  in  terms  of  fundamentals,  it is  quantitatively 
insufficient. 
In this light,  let us consider  the evidence  on the ERM crises of 1992- 
1993, making  use  of the checklist  of possible  types  of secular deteriora- 
tion given  in Section 4 above.  I focus on five countries whose  currencies 
were  attacked: France, Italy, Spain,  Sweden,  and the United  Kingdom. 
Consider  first the underlying  macroeconomic  situation of these econo- 
mies,  as measured  by four indicators: unemployment,  output gaps, infla- 
tion,  and  debt.  Some  relevant  data on  each are shown  in Figures 2-5. 
These  data  point  strongly  to  a  simple  conclusion:  all  five  economies 
were,  by  1992-1993,  in  a  situation  where  a  standard  macroeconomic 
diagnosis  would  prescribe monetary  expansion-a  monetary  expansion 
that was  blocked  by the  ERM. Thus all five  economies  had an evident 
incentive  to abandon  their parities. 
Figure 2 illustrates the obvious  point that the European recovery of the 
second  half of the 1990s had, by the time of the ERM crises, turned into a 368- KRUGMAN 
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severe  and  deepening  recession.  The rise in unemployment  had  been 
particularly severe  in Sweden  and the United  Kingdom,  least visible  in 
Italy. 
It might be objected  that many European countries have shown  secu- 
lar upward  trends in unemployment,  so that the level of unemployment 
gives only weak evidence  about the scope for monetary expansion.  How- 
ever,  standard  estimates  of  output  gaps-the  difference  between  the 
level  of output  and that consistent  with  a stable rate of inflation-show 
even more clearly the deterioration in the early 1990s. Figure 3 shows  the 
European Commission's  estimates  (European Commission  1995), which 
are similar to those  of other  institutions,  including  the  OECD and  the 
IMF8 
Consistent  with the view  that output in the early 1990s had fallen well 
below  its natural rate, Figure 4 shows  that after accelerating in the late 
1980s in the countries in question,  the inflation rate (as measured  by the 
GDP deflator) was both falling and at already quite low levels. 
How  should  we  think of the situation  implied  by these  observations? 
Suppose  that your view  of the macroeconomy  is a textbook natural-rate- 
plus-adaptive-expectations  model-that  is, a model in which the inflation 
rate accelerates  when  unemployment  is below  the NAIRU,  decelerates 
8. The  EC estimates  are based  not  on  an attempt  to estimate  a Phillips  curve,  but  on  a 
trend-fitting  technique.  However,  since  the actual level  of output  tends  in any  case to 
fluctuate  around  its "natural" level,  the results are similar. 
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when  unemployment  is above  the  NAIRU.  Then both  the  comparison 
with  trend  output  and  the  falling  inflation  rates in European  countries 
would  be clear indicators  that the recession  had pushed  unemployment 
rates well  above  the NAIRU, while  the combination  of low inflation and 
high unemployment  meant that governments  might reasonably feel that 
reducing  unemployment  was  more  urgent  than  driving  inflation  still 
lower. In short, the European economies-other  than Germany-were  in 
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a situation  in which  the  textbook  policy  recommendation  would  be an 
expansionary  monetary  policy.  Unfortunately,  a  commitment  to  an 
exchange-rate  mechanism  in which  Germany acted as de facto key cur- 
rency  country  left other  European  countries  no  room for independent 
monetary  policy. 
The case for a monetary expansion  frustrated by the commitment to the 
ERM is  reinforced  by  the  debt  situation  illustrated  in Figure 5,  which 
shows  the debt/GDP ratio. The marked deterioration in several countries, 
especially  Sweden  and Italy, meant both that fiscal expansion  as an alter- 
native  to monetary  policy was  out of the question,  and that a monetary 
expansion-which  would  have helped reduce outlays on unemployment 
benefits  and increased  tax revenues-was  that much more attractive. 
In short,  we  can easily make the case that for all five countries e* was 
substantially  larger than i-that  in the absence of the ERM commitment 
all five countries  would  have chosen  more expansionary  monetary  poli- 
cies,  leading  to a depreciation  of their currencies  against  the  Deutsche 
mark. 
Now  let us turn to the question  of whether  e* was predictably deterio- 
rating. The simplest  form of persistent  deterioration in fundamentals  is 
that  in  which  overvaluation  grows  over  time  via  "inertial" inflation, 
discussed  in Section 4 under the heading  (i). Here there is some diversity 
among  the European  countries.  Figure 6 shows  the real exchange  rates 
of Italy, Sweden,  and Spain against Germany from the beginning  of 1988 
to the  end  of 1994; these  three countries  continued  to experience  infla- 
x  -----c3 
v- 
,___.s----7 
-1  t_ 
I  I  I Are  Currency  Crises  Self-Fulfilling?  *  371 
_  _~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~i  ii  i  1,1  l  i  i  i  ,1i  i 
Figure  6 REAL  EXCHANGE  RATES:  DEVALUING  NATIONS 
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tion at more rapid rates than Germany despite being pegged  to or (in the 
case  of  Sweden)  "shadowing"  the  ecu,  and  thus  became  increasingly 
overvalued  up to their abandonment  of the parity in late 1992. 
The situations  of Britain and France, illustrated in Figure 7, were more 
complicated.  The United  Kingdom  entered  the ERM late,  and its entry 
followed  a substantial  nominal  and  real appreciation.  There was  little 
further real appreciation,  but a widespread  belief among economists  and 
businessmen  that the entry had taken place at too high an exchange rate. 
France showed  little change  in its real exchange  rate vis-a-vis  Germany. 
It might seem from this indicator that in the case of France and Britain, 
while  there was  a strong incentive  to adopt a more expansionary  mone- 
tary policy and hence  drop out of the ERM, there was no obvious  reason 
why that incentive  should grow stronger over time-i.e.,  no secular dete- 
rioration in e*. To many economists  at the time, however,  it seemed  that 
the pressures  for devaluation  were growing  despite  the absence of ongo- 
ing  real appreciation.  After  all,  unemployment  rates and  output  gaps 
were  rising in both  countries;  even  absent  real appreciation,  didn't this 
mean  that the gap between  e* and the ERM parity was  growing?  If one 
takes  standard  models  of  international  macroeconomics  seriously,  the 
ultimate test of whether a currency is overvalued  depends  not on interme- 
diate  indicators  like real exchange  rates, but on  actual macroeconomic 372 - KRUGMAN 
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performance-whatever  PPP calculations  say, exchange  rates must  ulti- 
mately be evaluated  on a PPE9  basis. 
Moreover, there was a particular reason-the  interaction between  Ger- 
man reunification  and the status of the Deutsche  mark as the de facto key 
currency-why  many observers believed  that there were growing  strains 
on the ERM, leading  a number of economists  to predict an ERM breakup 
well in advance  of the actual events  (see,  for example,  Krugman,  1990). 
This is a familiar story, but it is worth  repeating  briefly here  for the 
light it sheds  on the crisis. Figure 8, drawn from Krugman and Obstfeld 
(1994),10  illustrates the standard argument.  It shows  IS-LM diagrams for 
two countries:  a key currency country ("Germany") and a second  coun- 
try ("France") that has committed  itself to using  monetary  policy to peg 
its exchange  rate. If the exchange-rate  peg is fully credible, interest rates 
must be equal in the two countries. 
The  scenario  then  runs  as follows:  Germany, deciding  to finance  the 
costs  of reunification  with  debt  rather than current taxes,  engages  in a 
fiscal  expansion;  its  IS curve  shifts  out  to  IS'.  In  order  to  avert  any 
inflationary  pressures,  however,  the Bundesbank  offsets  this expansion 
9. The proof of the pudding  is in the eating. 
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with  a tight monetary  policy, shifting  LM in to LM' and leaving  output 
unchanged. 
Faced with  the resulting  rise in the German interest rate, France must 
match it in order to maintain the currency parity. It therefore is obliged to 
follow  the Bundesbank  with its own tight money  policy. Since this is not 
an offset to a fiscal expansion,  however,  the result is a decline in output, 
warranted not by the domestic  macroeconomic  situation but only by the 
need  to maintain parity with the mark. 
This is both a crude and a mechanical  representation  of the economic 
forces  involved,  but it nonetheless  makes  two  useful  points.  First, the 
fiscal shock  from German reunification  created a strain on the ERM-a 
motive  for European  nations  other  than  Germany  to  defect  from  the 
mechanism-that  had  not been  there before: in 1992 there was  conflict 
between  the  monetary  policy  that  seemed  appropriate  for  Germany 
and  that  which  seemed  appropriate  for other  European  nations,  in  a 
way  that had  not  been  the  case  earlier. Second,  the  analysis  points  to 
the  irrelevance  of  several  indicators  that  commentators  have  used  to 
argue  that France in particular was  not a reasonable  target for specula- 
tive  attack.  It has  been  pointed  out  that  in  1992-1993  France had  a 
lower  inflation  rate  than  Germany,  a  smaller  budget  deficit,  and  a 
current-account  surplus  compared  with  Germany's  deficit;  surely,  ar- 
gue  some  commentators,  this means  that the franc should  have been in 
a strong rather than a weak  position.  And  they therefore argue that the 
franc's  woes  demonstrate  that  even  a  country  with  no  fundamental 
problems  can  be  subjected  to  a devastating  speculative  attack.  But if 374  KRUGMAN 
one  takes  the  scenario  in Figure 8,  and  imagines  that France and  Ger- 
many  start from identical  macroeconomic  positions-the  same inflation 
rate,  the  same  budget  deficit,  and  the  same  current-account  balance- 
one  would  expect  to see France start to look better on all three: a lower 
budget  deficit  because  it  has  not  had  the  fiscal  expansion,  a  more 
positive  current  account  because  the  depressed  state  of  the  economy 
reduces  imports,  and  over  time  a lower  inflation  rate because  of  the 
output  gap.  Nonetheless,  in this story France has an incentive  to aban- 
don  its ERM parity in order to pursue  a more  expansionary  monetary 
policy; the indicators  often  cited in support  of the idea of a structurally 
strong franc are irrelevant. 
Could  it be  said  that  these  incentives  to  depreciate  were  increasing 
predictably over time? Again,  it is not hard to make a case. First, over the 
course  of 1991-1992  estimates  of the cost of German reunification-and 
hence  of  the  size  of  the  shock  illustrated  by  Figure  8-were  rising 
steadily.  Second,  as  pointed  out  in  Section  4,  the  political  and  social 
strains of a given  output  gap  tend  to mount  over time.  Third, we  may 
once again point to the debt problems,  which constituted  a visible source 
of growing  pressure  (and continue  to do so,  as recent events  in France 
demonstrate). 
On the basis  of all of these  indicators,  then,  it is hard to see on what 
basis  one  would  use  the  ERM crackup  as  evidence  for  self-fulfilling 
crises.  Fundamentals  relevant to the willingness  of governments  to con- 
tinue pegging  their currencies had clearly worsened,  and showed  every 
sign  of continuing  to worsen.  These  trends caused  many economists  to 
forecast a crisis-correctly. 
The only  argument  that one  might  make on behalf of a self-fulfilling- 
crisis  story  would  be  one  that  relies  heavily  on  the  absence  of  early 
warning  signs  in the financial markets.  Interest differentials against cri- 
sis  countries  did  not  begin  to widen  until  summer  1992. As  described 
above,  this observation  has been  interpreted  by Obstfeld  (1995) and by 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) to mean that the attacks must have been low- 
probability events,  instigated  by sunspots.  The failure of the markets to 
signal  any risks ahead  is indeed  puzzling.  However,  consider  how  the 
Obstfeld-Rogoff  argument  stands in the light of the evidence  above.  We 
must  argue  that  although  there  was  a substantial  deterioration  in  the 
fundamentals,  which  led  many  economists  to forecast a crisis-and  al- 
though these  forecasts  were right-nonetheless  the failure of the markets to 
anticipate  the  crisis  must  be  taken  as evidence  that this  crisis was  not 
justified by the fundamentals,  and instead was a self-fulfilling event that 
occurred out of the blue. 
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cion that financial markets were simply myopic in the runup to both the 
ERM  and the Mexican crises. Unfortunately, this conclusion wreaks havoc 
with  all of the  currently popular  models:  both the  "classical" view  that 
crises occur as soon as they can, because of forward-looking markets, and 
the "self-fulfilling" view  that crises can occur randomly, because  rational 
investors  know  that speculative  attacks will be validated. 
10. Concluding  Remarks 
Over the last two years international economists  have given  remarkably 
serious credence  to a view  that, if correct, might greatly change our view 
about  the  conduct  of both  macroeconomic  policy  and  financial-market 
regulation  in  open  economies.  This view,  grounded  in new  models  of 
speculative  attack, holds  that such  attacks on  fixed  exchange  rates are 
not, as has previously  been thought,  responses  to underlying  fundamen- 
tal weaknesses  of  the  currency  regime.  Rather, they  are self-fulfilling 
events  that can undermine  otherwise  sustainable  regimes; some  econo- 
mists  seem  even  to believe  that no  fixed rate is safe from such  attacks. 
In this paper I have tried to throw some (but not too much) cold water 
on this new  view.  One part of the new  view-that  governments  should 
be thought  of as trading off macroeconomic  objectives against credibility, 
rather  than  mechanically  pursuing  credit  creation  until  reserves  run 
out-is  surely correct. The new  literature goes  too far, however,  in sup- 
posing  that this change  in the underlying  macro and policy model  is in 
itself  a  necessary  reason  to  believe  in  multiple  equilibria  and  self- 
fulfilling  crises.  A  predictable  secular  deterioration  in fundamentals- 
which  was  a basic assumption  in the old literature-will  eliminate  the 
gap between  necessary  and sufficient conditions  for speculative  attack in 
many  of  the  new  models  as  well.  Uncertainty  of  the  right  kind  can 
restore some  indeterminacy  in the timing of speculative  attacks (in both 
old and new models),  but it can also create a pattern of "probing" attacks 
that  might  create  a false  impression  of  multiple  equilibria.  And  large 
agents  a la George Soros may act to narrow the range of indeterminacy. 
An  informal  review  of  the  available  empirical  evidence  also  casts 
doubt on the case for self-fulfilling  speculative  attack. In particular, there 
seem  to have  been  very  good  reasons  why  speculators  might  have  at- 
tacked the European countries  they did in 1992-1993.  It is puzzling  that 
markets  did  not  seem  concerned  about  the  possibility  of  such  attacks 
until  very  late,  especially  since  many  economic  analysts  had  warned 
about them  well  in advance; but this lack of early warning  can be made 
into evidence  for self-fulfilling-crisis  models  only through a fairly convo- 
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In sum,  we  should  not  take the analysis  of self-fulfilling  speculative 
attack  too  seriously,  at  least  not  yet.  For the  time  being  it is  best  to 
assume  that  most  countries  achieve  currency  crisis  the  old-fashioned 
way: they earn it. 
Appendix.  Deriving  the  Government's  Loss  Function  from  a 
Simple  Macro  Model 
This paper analyzes  the currency-crisis issue  in terms of a reduced-form 
government  loss function; the reason for doing so is that the logic of the 
analysis  is largely independent  of the details of the macro model.  And 
given  the inevitable  divisions  of opinion  about macro modeling  strategy, 
it seems  a good idea to put those details aside,  so that the main points of 
the analysis  do not get caught up in contentious  but orthogonal  issues. 
However,  it may also be useful  to show  how  one  particular model  can 
give rise to the assumed  loss function. 
Consider,  then,  a Mundell-Fleming-type  open-economy  macro model 
with  sticky  prices.  (In  this  model  these  prices  will  be  treated  as  a 
"fundamental"-an  assumption  that will  be  reasonable  in  a medium- 
term model  with  substantial  inertial inflation.  Such a model,  it may be 
argued,  is reasonable  for thinking about the ERM crises, although  not in 
all cases.)  In such  models,  output  is  demand-determined;  we  can lin- 
earize the model  to write output  as a function  of the real exchange  rate 
(which  determines  the competitiveness  of the country's  goods)  and the 
real interest rate: 
y =  a  +  p(e + p* -  p) -  y(i -  ir),  (29) 
where p*, p are the logs of the foreign and domestic price levels,  and vr  is 
the expected  rate of inflation. 
We may also introduce  a money  demand  equation; as this will play no 
role in the analysis,  it can be left generally  stated as 
m -  p = L(y,i).  (30) 
The economy  is assumed  open  to capital movement,  with  equalization 
of expected  returns; thus 
i=  i*  +  E  (31) 
with  i* the foreign  interest  rate and  E the expected  rate of depreciation. 
Finally, we  assume  that the government's  underlying  loss function  may 
be stated in terms of the deviation  of output from a desired level: Are  Currency  Crises  Self-Fulfilling?  *  377 
H  =  (y  - 
9)2.  (32) 
We may  now  define  the  "fundamental" e* as the  (log) exchange  rate 
that would  leave  output  equal  to its target level  in the  absence  of any 
expected  depreciation-that  is, we define e* implicitly so that 
y  =  a  +  3(e* +  p -  p*) -  y(i*  -  r),  (33) 
implying 
1 
e* =  [  -[-  a  +  (p -  p*) +  y(i* -  r)],  (34) 
which  in turn lets us write 
y  -  y  =  -/(e*  -  e) -  ye,  (35) 
leading  to the loss function 
H =  [P(e* -  e) +  yE)]2.  (36) 
The logic here is,  of course,  very simple:  output  is depressed  below  its 
target level  both by overvaluation  of the exchange  rate and by expecta- 
tions of depreciation,  which  raise domestic  interest rates. 
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itself is triggered by what journalists  and finance ministers  call the herd 
behavior  of investors  and  economic  theorists  call, for want  of a better 
term,  sunspots?  The first set of theories  produces  crises that are, in the 
absence  of  large  shocks  to  the  fundamentals,  predictable.  A  Monday- 
morning  quarterback  can  explain  exactly  why  the  crisis  should  have 
been  foreseen.  The second  set  of theories  produces  crises with  a more 
arbitrary character.  Although  we  can  see  the  role  of  fundamentals  in 
determining  the  conditions  that allow  the  crises  to occur, we  can also 
imagine  a different outcome. 
Paul definitely  favors  the first set of theories,  and not surprisingly- 
Krugman  (1979) was  one  of the  seminal  papers  in the development  of 
these  theories.  As economists,  we should  all favor these  sorts of theories 
a priori: ideally,  economic  fundamentals  should  pin  down  outcomes. 
Recent  events,  however,  especially  those  in Mexico  in  1994 and  early 
1995, have pushed  me in the direction of the second  set of theories  (see 
Cole and Kehoe,  1995). 
Although  Paul's  argument  that,  reinterpreted  correctly, the  classical 
theories  can still explain the recent current account crises in Europe and 
Mexico did not convince  me,  I learned a lot from reading his paper. The 
next  section  briefly  lays  out  what  I thought  to be  the  most  important 
contributions  of the paper. The third section  critiques Paul's theory and 
suggests  an alternative  in which  the economic  actors recognize  the dy- 
namic nature of the model.  The fourth, and final, section argues that the 
1994-1995  Mexican  crisis  had  an  arbitrary character that  is  better  ex- 
plained  using  the second  set of theories. 
2.  Contributions  of the Paper 
In  discussing  the  new  crisis  theories  that  have  followed  the  work  of 
Obstfeld  (1994),  Paul distinguishes  between  the  modeling  of  endoge- 
nous  policy and the possibility  for multiple equilibria in the models.  The 
decision  to  devalue  is  made  by  a  government  that  acts  to  maximize 
welfare in the domestic  economy  but cannot commit to its future actions. 
The government  therefore faces a time-consistency  problem in the sense 
of  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977).  As  Barro and  Gordon  (1983)  have 
stressed,  in this  sort of environment  the expectations  of private agents 
about  government  actions  have  an important  feedback  in determining 
what those  actions  should  be. 
As  Paul points  out,  in a model  with  endogenous  government  policy, 
any  economic  variable  can be  a fundamental  in  terms  of  explaining  a 
devaluation  if we can imagine that variable in the government's  objective 
function.  As  Paul's discussion  of the  European  Exchange  Rate Mecha- 380 *  Kehoe 
nism  crises  of  1992-1993  illustrates,  this  greatly  widens  the  scope  for 
explanations  of devaluations  that depend  on changes  in fundamentals. 
The  theoretical  emphasis  in Paul's paper  is on  an example  in which 
deterioration in fundamentals  sharply limits the possibilities  for multiple 
equilibria. The intuition  for this example is simple.  In models  like that of 
Obstfeld (1994, 1995), the government  faces a very different maximization 
problem if private agents have made decisions in expectation of the deval- 
uation than it does if private agents have made decisions in expectation of 
maintenance  of a fixed  exchange  rate. This opens  the way  for multiple 
equilibria: if private agents  expect a devaluation,  the government  finds it 
optimal to devalue,  but, if private agents expect a fixed exchange rate, the 
government  finds  it optimal  to  maintain  that  exchange  rate.  Suppose 
now,  that because  of deteriorating  fundamentals,  private agents  know 
that there  will  be a devaluation  on  or before  a fixed  date  T. Then  this 
knowledge  should  reduce  the  arbitrariness  of  expectations  in  period 
T -  1, thereby reducing  the possibilities  for multiple equilibria. Using an 
ingenious  argument  that relies heavily  on rational expectations,  Paul is 
able to work backwards and show that a devaluation will occur as soon as 
it is possible  to expect one.  This result is, of course, in line with those  in 
the  earlier generation  of  crisis theories  that followed  Krugman  (1979). 
Paul shows  that this result can be at least partially extended  to examples in 
which private agents are uncertain about the government's  objective func- 
tion and in which  the deterioration  of fundamentals  follows  a stochastic 
process. 
3.  Critique  of the  Theory 
In this section I argue that what drives the results that Paul obtains in his 
example  is  a  very  special  objective  function  for  the  government,  an 
objective  function  that is very  different  from those  employed  by Barro 
and Gordon  (1983) and by Obstfeld  (1994, 1995). This is not to say that 
Paul's  results  do  not  make  some  intuitive  sense  nor that they  are not 
indicative  of results that might emerge from analysis of more fully speci- 
fied  models.  In fact,  I argue  that deteriorating  fundamentals  do  act to 
limit the  possibilities  for multiple  equilibria in a model  whose  govern- 
ment's  objective function  generalizes  those of Krugman and of Obstfeld, 
but it does  not completely  eliminate  these possibilities. 
I begin  by considering  a simplified  version  of Obstfeld's  (1995) model 
of self-fulfilling  currency crises and  show  that deteriorating  fundamen- 
tals  play  no  role in  limiting  the  possibilities  for multiple  equilibria,  at 
least up until the period  in which  devaluation  is certain. In this model, 
which  I have  designed  to look  a lot like Paul's,  there are discrete  time Comment  *  381 
periods and two types of economic  actors, private agents and the govern- 
ment.  To simplify  the  presentation,  let  us  call  periods  days.  Private 
agents  take their actions  in the morning.  These actions depend  on,  and 
can be summarized  by, the expectations  that private agents have of what 
exchange  rate the government  will set in the afternoon,  eE. In the after- 
noon the government  takes its actions. These actions can be summarized 
by the exchange  rate that the government  sets,  et. In equilibrium et = ee. 
In period  t there is an exchange  rate e* that would  be the optimal rate to 
set in the absence  of other commitments.  There is also a fixed exchange 
rate e to which  the government  has committed  itself. In the first period 
that the  government  breaks  this  commitment  by  devaluing  it incurs  a 
cost of C. The government  chooses  et to minimize  the static loss function 
[a(et -  et) + b(eE  -  et)]2  +  8C, 
where  8 is  an  indicator  function  that  takes  on  the  value  8  =  1 if the 
government  breaks its commitment  to maintaining  the fixed rate e and 
takes on the value of 8 = 0 if it keeps its commitment.  The term a(et -  et) 
captures  cost of deviating  from the optimal rate et.  In Obstfeld's  model 
the analogous  term emerges  from a simple Keynesian  macro model  that 
includes  the current devaluation  of the currency, et -  et_-.  The term b(eE - 
et) captures  the  cost  of having  private agents  make  decisions  based  on 
expectations  that later prove to be mistaken. 
Suppose  that private agents expect there to be a devaluation  and set et 
=  e.  Then the government  will, in fact, devalue and set et = e* if the cost 
of doing  so is less  than the cost of maintaining  the fixed rate et = e, 
C <  (a +  b)2(et  -  )2. 
Suppose,  however,  private agents  expect  there not to be a devaluation 
and set eE = e. Then the government  will only and  set end set  = (ae*  + 
be)l(a +  b) if the cost of doing  so is less  than the cost of maintaining  the 
fixed rate et  = e, 
C <  a2(et -  e)2. 
In the range of parameters for which 
a2(et -  e)2  C <  (a + b)2(e -  e)2 
there  are two  possible  equilibria, one  of which  involves  a self-fulfilling 
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Consider  now  the case of deteriorating  fundamentals  in which  et in- 
creases either deterministically  or stochastically. The possibility  of multi- 
ple equilibria disappears  as soon  as et increases  to the point where 
a2(e  -  _)2  >  C. 
In the  first period  T in which  this inequality  is satisfied  it is no longer 
rational for private agents  to believe  that the government  will maintain 
its commitment  to the fixed rate. The only possible  equilibrium involves 
devaluation. 
Does  the  knowledge  that eT=eT  have  any effect on the possibility  for 
multiple  equilibria in period  T -  1? In this model  it does  not,  and here 
Paul's argument  does  not work. 
Suppose,  however,  as  does  Paul,  that  the  government's  static  loss 
function  is 
[a(at -  et) +  b(e,E+  -  et)]2  +  8C. 
Implicitly,  this  loss  function  assumes  that  the  crucial  determinant  of 
private agents'  actions this morning  are expectations,  not of the govern- 
ment's  actions  this  afternoon,  but  of  those  tomorrow  afternoon.  With 
this loss  function,  Paul's backward induction  argument  about certainty 
of devaluation  in period  T feeding  back into early periods goes  through. 
There is, however,  a minor technical problem with the specification  of 
Paul's loss  function  in the case of deteriorating fundamentals,  e*+1  >  et: 
Even with  a floating exchange  rate, it is not a rational-expectations  equi- 
librium to set e  =  et.  Instead,  et should  be the solution  to the difference 
equation  given  by the first-order condition 
a(e*  -  et) +  b(et+  -  e,) =  0  t  1  + 
and the equilibrium condition  et+l  =  et+.  This solution  is 
b  [  a  s 
aet  +bsE  a+b  ]s 
This, of course,  makes the interpretation of et problematical, but it illus- 
trates  the  need  for some  care in labeling  variables by  time  period  t in 
dynamic  models. 
A possible  defense  of Paul's approach  would  be that Obstfeld's  loss 
function  allows  no  feedback  of  expectations  about  the  future  on  the Comment 383 
equilibrium  today,  and  that  such  a feedback  is a desirable  feature  of a 
dynamic  model.  Consider  a hybrid  loss  function  that includes  both  a 
Barro-Gordon-Obstfeld  term to allow  for the cost of mistaken  expecta- 
tions  of  private  agents  and  a Krugman  term  to  allow  for  the  cost  of 
expected  devaluation, 
[a(et  -  et) +  b(e'  -  e,) +  c(eE+l -  e)]2  +  8C. 
To make  the  discussion  simple,  I will  deal with  the  case with  constant 
fundamentals  where  e* =  e*. In the case of deteriorating  fundamentals 
and a floating exchange  rate the optimal government  policy is to set 
c  a  s 
a+c  =  a+c_  a +  c  so  [a  +  ] eI 
and the basic argument  stays the same. 
If private agents  expect a devaluation  and set eE =  efE+ = e*, then it is 
optimal for the government  to devalue  if 
C <  (a +  b +  c)2(e*  -  e)2 
If, however,  private agents  expect no devaluation  and set et =  et+1  =  e, 
then it is only optimal for the government  to devalue  if 
C <  a2(e* -  e)2 
There are multiple  equilibria for parameters in the range 
a2(e* -  e)2  C <  (a +  b +  c)2(e* -  e)2 
In this  model  is  a feedback  of  expectations  about  the  future  on  the 
equilibrium  today. To see  this,  suppose  that, for one reason or another, 
private  agents  know  that the exchange  rate will be floating in period  T 
and  therefore  set  eT =  e*. If these  agents  also  set  eET_ =  e*, then  it is 
optimal for the government  to devalue  if 
C <  (a +  b + c)2(e  -  e)2 
If, however,  they  set eE_l  =  e, then it is only optimal for the government 
to devalue  if 384 *  Kehoe 
C < (a + c)2(e*  -  e)2. 
Although  certainty  about devaluation  tomorrow  does  limit possibilities 
for multiple equilibria today, it does not completely  eliminate these possi- 
bilities: For parameters in the range 
a2(e* -  e)2 <  C <  (a +  c)2(e* -  e)2 
multiple equilibria are possible  if eE is not pinned  down by fundamentals, 
but multiple  equilibria are not possible  if e' =  e*. For parameters in the 
range 
(a +  c)2(e*  -  e)2 _  C <  (a + b + c)2(e*  -  e)2 
however,  multiple  equilibria are possible  whether  eT  is pinned  down  by 
fundamentals  or not. 
There  is  probably  little  to  be  gained  from  further  discussion  along 
these  lines.  Both Paul's and Obstfeld's  (1994, 1995) analysis use minimi- 
zation  of a static loss  function  as a reduced  form for maximization  of an 
intertemporal  objective function.  Paul's loss function is special because it 
does  not include  any cost of private agents'  being  wrong  in the current 
period.  Obstfeld's  loss function is special because expectations  about the 
future  play  no  role  in  determining  equilibrium  in  the  current  period. 
Which of these  models  better approximates  a fully dynamic equilibrium 
model? There is little way  to tell without  constructing  a model  in which 
the  economic  actors actually  recognize  the intertemporal  nature  of the 
model. 
4.  Critique  of the  Evidence 
In his paper Paul uses his proposed  theory to analyze the European ERM 
crises  of  1992-1993.  In this  section  I use  the critique of his  theory  pre- 
sented  in the previous  section  to analyze  the 1994-1995 Mexican crisis. I 
distinguish  between  two  components  of this  crisis: the  devaluation  of 
December  20-22,  1994 and the failure of the Mexican government  bond 
auctions  in late December  1994 and January 1995. The devaluation  was 
the result  of a combination  of an unprecedented  sequence  of shocks  to 
the  Mexican  political  and  economic  system  together  with  government 
policies  that treated  these  shocks  as transitory. This component  of the 
crisis can be analyzed  using  Paul's model  of stochastically  deteriorating 
fundamentals.  As I have argued in the previous  section,  however,  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  devaluation  should  have  been  fully Comment 385 
expected  when  it finally  occurred.  The failure of the  Mexican  govern- 
ment bond  auctions  was  the result of a debt management  policy during 
1994 that  allowed  much  of  the  Mexican  government  debt  to  become 
short-term  and dollar-indexed.  Currently, the best theory for analyzing 
this  component  of the  crisis relies  on  the multiple  equilibria feature  of 
the new  crisis theories. 
In 1994, as it had in 1992 and 1993, Mexico ran a large current-account 
deficit.  What changed  in 1994 was  the level  of foreign portfolio  invest- 
ment.  1994 was a difficult year politically for Mexico: there was an upris- 
ing in Chiapas in January; the presidential candidate of the ruling Partido 
Revolucionario  Institutional  (PRI), Luis Donaldo  Colosio  Murrieta, was 
assassinated  in  March;  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  Jorge  Carpizo 
McGregor, who  had been charged with ensuring  honest  elections  in Au- 
gust,  threatened  to resign in June; the Secretary General of the PRI, Jose 
Francisco Ruiz Massieu,  was assassinated  in September; Ruiz Massieu's 
brother Mario resigned  as assistant attorney general in November,  charg- 
ing  a high-level  coverup  of the assassination  within  the PRI; and there 
were threats of new  uprisings  in Chiapas in November  and December. I 
find  it  hard  to  agree  with  Paul's  assertion  that  international  financial 
markets should  not have been surprised by these events: Colosio's assas- 
sination was the first major political assassination  in Mexico since that of 
Alvaro Obreg6n  in 1928. 
The  political  uncertainty  generated  by  these  events,  combined  with 
rising interest rates that made the United States a more attractive invest- 
ment target, resulted  in a substantial drop in foreign investment:  foreign 
portfolio investment  in Mexico fell from USD 28.4 billion in 1993 to USD 
8.2 billion in 1994. (It is worth noting,  however,  that foreign direct invest- 
ment actually rose from USD 4.9 billion to USD 8.0 billion.) 
Perhaps  even  more  significantly,  there were  presidential  elections  in 
August,  with  the  new  president,  Ernesto Zedillo  Ponce  de  Le6n,  who 
had  replaced  Colosio  as the  PRI candidate,  taking office in December. 
The change  of government  was,  as it has been every six years in Mexico 
since 1928, a time of great uncertainty. At the end of each of the previous 
three  administrations-in  1976,  1982, and  1987-there  had  been  large 
devaluations.  Mexicans  and  foreign  investors  had  come  to  associate 
ends  of presidential  terms with devaluations. 
In the  face  of  the  drop  in foreign  investment,  the  administration  of 
President  Carlos Salinas  de  Gortari continued  to maintain  the value  of 
the peso  against  the  dollar. There were  good  reasons  to do  so,  at least 
during  the first half of 1994. A series of social pacts negotiated  between 
leaders  of government,  business,  and labor had,  since 1987, set a policy 
of  a maximum  allowable  rate of  depreciation  of  the  peso  against  the 386 *  Kehoe 
dollar.  This  policy  had  resulted  in  a decline  in  the  rate of inflation  in 
Mexico  from  159.2% in  1987 to  7.1% in  1994.  At  the  same  time  real 
wages,  which  had fallen sharply following  the 1982 financial crisis, rose 
by more than 20% between  1987 and 1994. 
To the  extent  to  which  the  Salinas  administration  believed  that  the 
shocks  that buffeted  Mexico  in  1994 were  transitory, it was  justified  in 
selling  the  Banco de  Mexico's  foreign  reserves  to insulate  Mexico from 
these  shocks.  At the same  time that Mexicans and foreigners  were  sell- 
ing  pesos  for dollars,  the  Banco de Mexico was  sterilizing  by reissuing 
the pesos.  This policy  was  designed  to promote  a stable money  supply 
and  interest  rates.  With  elections  upcoming  in  August,  it  is  easy  to 
understand  why  these  sorts of policies  were  attractive during  the  first 
three quarters of 1994. 
Policy judgments  often  involve  calculated risks, and poor judgments 
are far easier to identify  if there is a run of bad luck than if there is not. 
As  political  shocks  continued  to hit Mexico during  the fall of 1994, for- 
eign  reserves  fell  to  dangerously  low  levels.  November  was  a crucial 
month: it was in that month  that foreign reserves fell below  the Mexican 
monetary  base,  and on November  18 alone  the Banco de Mexico had to 
sell USD 1.7 billion to maintain the value of the peso. 
Figure 1 traces out the behavior  of foreign reserves  held by the Banco 
de Mexico during 1994. It is worth noting that the Banco de Mexico made 
significant interventions  in the peso-dollar  markets only during six brief 
periods: January 19-February  11, following  Mexico's entry into NAFTA, 
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when  despite  the  uprising  in  Chiapas,  the  Banco  de  Mexico  had  to buy 
USD  4.2  billion  to  keep  the  value  of  the  peso  down;  March  25-April  21, 
following  Colosio's  assassination,  when  it had  to  sell  USD  10.4  billion  to 
keep  the  value  of  the  peso  up;  June  23-July  12,  during  the  uncertainty 
over  the  Carpizo  resignation,  when  it  sold  USD  2.7  billion;  November 
14-23,  during  Mario  Ruiz  Massieu's  allegations  of  a  coverup  of  his 
brother's  assassination,  when  it  sold  USD  3.6  billion;  December  15-19, 
during  threats  of  a  new  uprising  in  Chiapas,  when  it  sold  USD  1.8 
billion;  and  December  20-21,  during  the  first  stage  of devaluation,  when 
it  sold  USD  4.6  billion.  During  these  six  periods  the  Banco  de  Mexico 
intervened  on  a total  of 53 days.  During  all of the  rest  of  1994  the  Banco 
de  Mexico  only  intervened  on  18 days,  selling  a total  of  USD  1.2  billion. 
(All  of  these  data  are  taken  from  Banco  de  Mexico,  1995.) 
Figure  2 illustrates  the  response  of  monetary  policy  to  the  decline  in 
reserves:  the  Banco  de  Mexico  sterilized,  in  January  and  February,  by 
contracting  domestic  credit  to  keep  the  money  supply  down  as  it  sold 
pesos  for  dollars,  and,  later,  by  expanding  domestic  credit  to  keep  the 
money  supply  up  as  it  bought  pesos  with  dollars.  This  policy  helped 
insulate  the  Mexican  domestic  economy,  in particular  the  banking  indus- 388 *  Kehoe 
try, from a sharp decline in the money  supply  that would  have otherwise 
resulted  in the drop in foreign portfolio investment.  In 1994 the Mexican 
banking industry, which had expanded  rapidly following  its privatization 
in  1991, was  in fragile  condition:  nonperforming  loans  had  risen  from 
2.3% of total loans in 1990 to 9.5% by the end of 1994. 
In retrospect,  Mexican monetary policy during 1994 can be viewed  as a 
calculated gamble: The Salinas administration  reacted to the shocks that 
led  to  falls  in  foreign  portfolio  investment  as  though  each  shock  had 
been the last that would  occur. In particular, it ran down foreign reserves 
in  an  effort  to  keep  both  the  exchange  rate and  the  domestic  money 
supply  constant.  Unfortunately,  the shocks kept occurring, and, absent a 
sharp  tightening  of  monetary  policy  in  the  fall  of  1994,  Mexico  was 
eventually  forced to let the peso  devalue. 
The devaluation  occurred more or less  simultaneously  with,  and per- 
haps  touched  off, a debt crisis in which  the Mexican government  found 
itself unable to roll over its debt. Fears of a default of one sort or another 
totally paralyzed  the economy  in late December  1994 and January 1995. 
It is this second  aspect of the crisis that helps explain why Mexico did not 
emerge stronger after the devaluation,  as had European countries follow- 
ing  the  ERM crisis and  as observers  like Dornbusch  and Werner (1994) 
had predicted  it would. 
Mexican  government  debt  can be divided  into two  broad categories: 
domestic  debt  and  external  debt.  This division  has nothing  to do with 
who  holds  the debt; rather it depends  on where it is sold.  Domestic  debt 
is sold  at auctions  held  by the Banco de Mexico,  while  external debt is 
sold  abroad.  The  debt  crisis  was  caused  by  a run  on  domestic  debt. 
Although  yields  on  such  external debt instruments  as Brady bonds  in- 
creased  sharply  on secondary  markets during the crisis, Mexican exter- 
nal debt has a long  maturity structure. The immediate  danger of default 
was  the result of the short maturity structure of the domestic  debt. 
Following  the assassination  of Colosio in March, the Mexican govern- 
ment  steadily  converted  its domestic  debt from peso-denominated  cetes, 
bondes, and adjustabonos  into short-term,  dollar-indexed  tesobonos,  as de- 
picted in Figure 3. In the second  week  of March 1994, due to uncertainty 
about the  situation  in Chiapas  and a possible  independent  presidential 
campaign by Manuel Camacho Solis, who had been edged  out as the PRI 
candidate  by Colosio,  the peso  had begun  to fall against the dollar. The 
assassination  sharply accelerated this fall, and the peso  moved  from the 
bottom to the top of its trading band, devaluing  by almost 8 percent over 
a month.  This drop in the value  of the peso  led  to a sharp increase  in 
Mexican  interest  rates  with  a resulting  drop  in  the  prices  of  Mexican 
bonds  and equities. Comment 389 
Figure  3 MEXICAN  INTERNATIONAL  RESERVES  VS. GOVERNMENT 
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The  movement  away  from  the  peso-denominated  debt  into  short- 
term,  dollar-indexed  debt  helped  to  shield  debt  holders  from  ex- 
change-rate  risk. It also allowed  the Mexican government  to borrow at 
substantially  lower  interest  rates, as shown  in Figure 4. The movement 
in  the  composition  of  the  debt  had  two  adverse  effects  on  Mexican 
government  finances,  however:  it exposed  the government  to far more 
exchange-rate  risk,  and  it sharply  reduced  the  already  short  maturity 
structure of the debt. 
Following  the  December  20-22  devaluation,  rumors  abounded  that 
the Mexican government  would  impose  dual exchange  rates, paying  off 
tesobonos  at an official rate lower than the market rate. It did not take too 
long  a memory  to recall that the Mexican  government  had  resorted  to 
similar policies  during  the  1982 financial crisis. The tesobono  auctions  of 
December  27,  January 3,  and  January 10 were  complete  failures:  the 
Banco de Mexico was  able to sell only  USD  143 million worth  of bonds 
out of USD 1.5 billion offered. 
Calvo and Mendoza  (1995), Cole and Kehoe (1995), and Sachs, Tornell, 
and  Velasco  (1995) all argue  that  the  Mexican  debt  crisis  can  be  best 
understood  in terms of models  with multiple equilibria: Investors feared 390 *  Kehoe 
Figure 4 MEXICAN  AND U.S. GOVERNMMENT  BONDS:  DECEMBER  1993- 
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that Mexico would  be unable to honor its commitments  on bonds becom- 
ing  due.  These  fears made  these  investors  unwilling  to purchase  new 
bonds.  The resulting failure of the government's  auctions put the govern- 
ment into a position  where  default seemed  inevitable,  thereby justifying 
the expectations  that the Mexican government  would be unable to honor 
its commitments.  Had these  expectations  not been present,  however,  no 
crisis would  have  occurred. 
To explain the logic of this approach, I will briefly sketch out the Cole- 
Kehoe model  and its central results.  This model has three sorts of actors: 
domestic  consumers,  who make consumption  and investment  decisions; 
foreign  investors  who  purchase  government  debt and are risk-neutral, 
reflecting  the small size  of the country relative to world capital markets; 
and  a  government  which  taxes,  spends  on  public  goods,  offers  new 
bonds  for sale,  and  decides  whether  or not  to honor  commitments  on 
old bonds.  The central actor in the model  is the government.  Cole and 
Kehoe  (1995) model  the  government  as benevolent  in  that it seeks  to 
maximize  the welfare  of the domestic  consumers;  they  show,  however, 
how  it is also possible  to model  the government  as more impatient  than 
consumers  or  international  investors.  The  consumers',  and  govern- Comment 391 
ment's, welfare depends both on private  consumption and on provision 
of the public good. 
The government cannot commit to repaying its debt; all of the ac- 
tors know  that  the  government resolves  its  maximization problem 
every period. If the expected present value of defaulting exceeds that 
of repaying old debt, the government will default. If the government 
defaults, the country is subject to a penalty that results in a decline in 
domestic productivity. This penalty reflects, for example, the  large 
distortion created by  the  imposition of dual exchange rates. In the 
model, for high enough levels of government debt, a crisis can occur 
depending on the realization  of a random event that is extrinsic to the 
fundamentals of the model, a sunspot variable. An unfavorable real- 
ization of this sunspot variable can lead to a panic in which the inter- 
national investors are unwilling to purchase new  government debt. 
This panic is rational if the failure of the new-debt auction puts the 
government in  a situation where it prefers to default. At the same 
time, however,  the panic is  somewhat arbitrary  because a favorable 
realization of  the  sunspot  variable would  not  lead to  a  panic, the 
government would be able to sell its new debt, and no crisis would 
occur. 
In this model a self-fulfilling  crisis  is possible if the government  would 
choose  to  default if  no  new  borrowing were  possible,  but  would 
choose  to  honor its  commitments if new  borrowing were possible. 
Cole and Kehoe (1995) show that, if a crisis is possible, the probability 
of  its  occurrence is  arbitrary:  for any probability of  an unfavorable 
realization of  the  sunspot  variable, there is  a different equilibrium. 
Although Cole and Kehoe model the crisis as dependent on a sunspot 
variable, it is  also possible to  model it as  dependent on  a random 
event  connected  to  the  fundamentals, such  as  political shock. The 
essential point is that there are multiple equilibria:  there is an equilib- 
rium in which the shock touches off a crisis and there is an equilib- 
rium in which it does not. 
The crucial  insight of the model is that the government  finds itself in a 
far different position if it cannot sell its new bonds than if it can. If the 
level of government debt is low compared  to its ability  to raise revenue, 
however, these positions are not very different: the government will 
choose to repay its debt and to avoid the default penalty whether or not 
new borrowing  is possible. Similarly,  if the maturity  structure  of the debt 
is long enough, these positions are not very different:  with government 
debt of long maturity little new borrowing has to be done in any one 
period. 392 *  Kehoe 
Paul makes  the point  that self-fulfilling-crisis  models  are a concession 
by economic  theorists  to the government  officials in countries  subject to 
speculative  attacks who  complain  about nefarious forces, herd behavior, 
and so on.  If so,  it is a limited concession.  These models,  like the Cole- 
Kehoe  model  just sketched  out,  tend to say that it is government  policy 
that puts  a country  into  a situation  where  such  an attack can succeed. 
Alternative  government  policies  can eliminate  the  possibility  of a self- 
fulfilling crisis. 
It is worth returning to one final point discussed  by Paul: Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995) have argued in favor of self-fulfilling-crisis models by show- 
ing  that  interest  premia  are  often  low  before  the  attack  takes  place. 
Figure 4 shows  the relevant data for Mexico in 1994, which  indicate that 
neither the devaluation,  which  decreased  the value of cetes, nor the debt 
crisis, which  decreased  the value of tesobonos,  were anticipated by finan- 
cial markets.  Paul characterizes Obstfeld and Rogoff's argument as inge- 
nious but dismisses  it because  of its heavy reliance on the assumption  of 
rational  expectations  on  the  part of  investors.  This  heavy  reliance  on 
rational expectations  is present  in most  theories  of crises,  however,  in- 
cluding  Paul's own. 
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Comment 
MAURICE OBSTFELD 
University  of California,  Berkeley,  and NBER 
1. Introduction 
This paper  contains  much  nice  analysis,  which,  as happens  whenever 
Paul Krugman  puts  hand  to word  processor,  yields  insights  for which 
we all must be grateful. 
These  positive  contributions  of  the  paper  are somewhat  incidental, 
however,  to its main thrust,  which  is to debunk  the view  that currency 
crises can be driven in a significant way by self-fulfilling speculative expec- 
tations.  In pursuit  of his purpose,  Krugman makes  three major claims: 
1.  His  first claim concerns  the  "new" literature that views  speculative 
attacks as the  outcome  of a game  between  purposeful  governments 
and  profit-maximizing  markets.  Krugman argues  that this literature 
takes  the  position  that  "attacks on  fixed  exchange  rates are not,  as 
had  previously  been  thought,  responses  to underlying  fundamental 
weaknesses  of the currency regime." The new view, he asserts, main- 
tains  as  a central  tenet  the  proposition  that policy  optimization  by 
governments  "is in  itself  a necessary  reason  to believe  in  multiple 
equilibria and self-fulfilling  crises." 
2.  Krugman  contends  that the  new  literature has  missed  a central in- 
sight in dropping  the pivotal assumption  in his own  1979 model,  that 
fundamentals  deteriorate predictably over time (at least on average). 
Once  this assumption  is reintroduced,  the  "new" crisis models  lead 
to unique  attack equilibria, just as in Krugman's original analysis. 
3.  Finally,  Krugman  argues  that  the  EMS crisis  of  1992-1993  is  well 
understood  as one  in which  fundamentals  deteriorated  predictably 
and inexorably  over time.  Indeed  (he claims),  there is little evidence 
at all to support  the  notion  that any  speculative  attack ever under- 
mined  an exchange  peg that would  have been sustainable absent the 
attack itself.  It is  more  reasonable  to  think  most  exchange-rate  re- 
gimes  that have  collapsed  would  have  done  so  even  if speculators 
had remained  passive  throughout  the process. 
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All  three  of  these  claims  are debatable.  Indeed,  I will  argue  in  this 
discussion  that claim 1 is wrong,  that claim 2 is not robust, and that the 
evidence  in favor of claim 3 is far from compelling. 
2.  What the New Crisis Theory  Really  Says 
Much  of Krugman's  assault  on  the new  crisis theory  is an assault  on a 
straw  man.  The  theory  does  not  assert  that exchange  rates can be  at- 
tacked any time,  any place,  irrespective  of the state of economic  funda- 
mentals.  But the theory  does  suggest  that we broaden  our definition  of 
fundamentals  to encompass  the incentives  and constraints under which 
governments  operate,  including  political  incentives  and  constraints. 
This  perspective  makes  clear precisely  what  Krugman asserts  that the 
theory  denies:  preexisting  economic  problems  make  governments  that 
peg exchange  rates more vulnerable to the pain that speculative  anticipa- 
tions,  in and of themselves,  can inflict. 
Krugman  seems  to  accept  the  empirical  relevance  of  these  mecha- 
nisms  in his paper. What he seems  reluctant to accept-even  though  his 
model  with  uncertain  future fundamentals  reaches the same conclusion 
as the new  crisis theory-is  that there can be an important set of practi- 
cal  situations  in  which  currency  pegs  may  be  run  even  though  they 
might have  survived  indefinitely  in the absence  of a run. 
The  distinction  between  that  type  of  situation  and  what  Krugman 
modeled  in  his  1979 paper  is  somewhat  analogous  to  the  distinction 
between  the liquidity  and solvency  problems  of banks and other finan- 
cial institutions.  Of course there is no neat dividing line between  illiquid 
and  insolvent  institutions,  since  illiquidity  presupposes  at least  some 
threat of insolvency.  But most of us still believe  that an ultimately viable 
bank might  go  under  if its depositors  and interbank lenders  panicked. 
Thus,  there  can  be  self-fulfilling  bank  runs,  which  might  spread  via 
contagion  effects  even  to healthier institutions. 
This reasoning,  which  underlies  much of our public policy toward the 
financial sector, does  not deny  that there are some banks so strong they 
could not be run, and some with balance sheets  so weak as to be inevita- 
bly  doomed.  But there  is also  a gray area, in which  a bank that hits a 
patch of bad luck could go under even though  the bad luck is temporary. 
The  bank's  problems  are not  necessarily  independent  of fundamental 
factors, but those  factors are not so severe  as to make it unconditionally 
insolvent. 
Similarly,  countries  can  have  patches  of  bad  luck,  and  most,  even 
those  without  badly  trending  fundamentals,  do.  The occasional  cyclical 
downturn  is  a common  form  of  largely  temporary  bad  luck.  In these Comment  395 
circumstances,  a country  may become vulnerable  to attack  if it is pegging 
its exchange rate and if the authorities lack the political will to resist a 
strong attack. Such attacks  are not independent of what is happening to 
the fundamentals in the economy-but  they are not always necessary 
outcomes either. 
Although Krugman  is more careful at some points in his discussion, 
he frequently falls into the habit of setting up what I characterize  in my 
1994 paper as a "false dichotomy" between justified and purely self- 
fulfilling crises. Invoking this false dichotomy, he at times misleadingly 
paints the newer theories as models in which attacks  are divorced from 
fundamentals. This sleight-of-hand allows him to portray almost any 
evidence of economic malaise prior  to a crisis as an exhibit  in support of 
his preferred  model. But  in reality,  his characterization  of the approach  is 
a caricature. 
For example, in a recent paper, Kenneth Rogoff and I wrote: "More 
recent theories (of crises) emphasize the importance  of economic funda- 
mentals as broadly  determining  the potential  vulnerability  of a fixed rate 
regime to attack, but incorporate  a multiplicity  of equilibria  so that the 
exact timing of the attack can depend  on sunspots.  ...  In these models, 
currency  crises, like bank runs, can be self-fulfilling  events in which the 
crisis itself creates the economic pressure under which the government 
caves in." (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995, p. 86.) Krugman's  translation  is 
that we think the ERM  crisis "was not justified  by the fundamentals,  and 
instead was a self-fulfilling event that occurred  out of the blue." Such 
literary  license doesn't help to clarify  the issues. The interesting  question 
is not whether the crisis  was "justified"  by fundamentals,  since everyone 
agrees the fundamentals play and must play a role, but whether the 
fundamentals were such as to make the crisis the inevitable  and unique 
outcome.1 
Indeed, theorists have not asserted, either, that multiple equilibria  are 
inevitable. Here we have to be a bit precise about the class of equilibria 
under discussion. The new models are strategic. We know that if we 
admit unrestricted  history-dependent  trigger  strategies,  almost anything 
becomes possible. But in general the literature  has restricted  itself to the 
(arguably)  more interesting subclass of Markov  perfect equilibria  within 
which players' strategies are functions only of current state variables. 
1. Incidentally,  it is often charged  that  to embrace  multiple-equilibrium  theories  of crises  is to 
give aid and comfort  to incompetent  government  officials  who claim  disingenuously  to 
have been victimized  by aggressive  markets.  This  accusation  is, at best, very misleading. 
The newer models show that governments  may well be to blame  for creating  conditions 
(e.g., high public debts) that make them vulnerable  to attack,  as well as for their own 
unchecked  propensities  to accommodate  inflation  or depreciation  expectations. 396 *  OBSTFELD 
Krugman  seems  to be claiming  that the  literature asserts  an inevitable 
multiplicity  of  Markov  perfect  equilibria simply  because  policymakers 
are optimizing.  This is not true. And it would  be strange if it were, as the 
macro  political-economy  literature  contains  a  good  number  of  well- 
known  models  with  unique  one-shot  game equilibria. 
The  truth is that a number  of the recent papers  in this area describe 
quite clearly situations  with unique  one-shot  game equilibria, and are at 
pains  to  show  how  deterioration  of  the  fundamentals-higher  public 
debt,  a higher  natural  rate of  unemployment,  lower  political  commit- 
ment  to  the  exchange-rate  regime,  and  so  on-may  open  the  door  to 
multiplicities.  [In my 1995 working  paper (published  as Obstfeld,  1996), 
which  Krugman  cites,  I go on  at some  length  about how  very  good  or 
very  bad  fundamentals  often  will  tend  to  imply  unique  equilibria, 
whereas  intermediate  cases  can allow  self-fulfilling  crises.  Recent work 
by Jeanne (1995) and Velasco (1996) makes the same point.] 
3.  The  Importance  of Trending  Fundamentals 
Krugman  suggests  that by dropping  the assumption  of badly trending 
fundamentals,  new  crisis  theories  have  missed  the  possibility  of  a 
unique  equilibrium  despite  policy  optimization.  As  I have  already  ar- 
gued,  no one ever seriously  claimed that equilibrium must be nonunique 
in a model  with  policy  optimization,  even  without  trending fundamen- 
tals.  Furthermore,  because  we  already  knew  that  exchange-rate  pegs 
would  ultimately  become  unsustainable  in scenarios of progressive  eco- 
nomic deterioration,  it was natural for researchers to focus on stationary 
environments.  The  question  of  clearest  interest-and  a question  that 
had  not  been  satisfactorily  resolved-was  whether  pegs  that were  not 
obviously  unsustainable  in the long run could be pushed  over the edge 
by the force of speculative  expectations.2 
Krugman  argues  that  adding  a trend  in  the  fundamentals  makes  a 
world  of  difference.  Adding  a trend,  he  claims,  makes  the  timing  of 
attacks determinate  once again, just as in Krugman (1979). However,  the 
ingeniously  simple  model  of the paper's Section 4 doesn't  really show  in 
any generality what Krugman says it shows,  namely, that merely putting 
a  trend  into  fundamentals  necessarily  restores  uniqueness,  or,  as  he 
says,  makes  "multiple equilibria disappear as an issue." 
I say  this  for  two  reasons.  First,  there  are  some  loose  ends  to  the 
model.  We don't  really  find  out  what  happens  after an exchange-rate 
2. There  has  nonetheless  been  some  effort other  than  Krugman's  to incorporate  secular 
trends.  See,  for example,  Spadafora (1996). Comment 397 
change-a  float, a realignment,  perpetual bliss? But as Krugman's work 
has  taught  us,  the  postcrisis  regime  is critical for what  happens  in the 
runup to a crash. Second,  there are some  subtle issues  of timing that are 
briefly acknowledged,  but then put aside.  These,  I believe,  substantially 
affect the weight  we want to put on the model's  predictions. 
Central to the model  of deteriorating fundamentals  in Section 4 is the 
construct of a target or "shadow" exchange rate e*(t)  to which the govern- 
ment would  devalue  on date t if not constrained by its realignment costs. 
This shadow  rate rises inexorably  over time,  and there is a date T such 
that  the  government  finds  it  optimal  to  devalue  to  e*(T) even  when 
markets expect  exchange  stability. Since markets can anticipate this de- 
valuation  on  date  T  -  1,  devaluation  will  actually  occur  then  if  the 
combined  cost of overvaluation  and high interest rates makes this action 
worthwhile,  and  if devaluation  is  not  yet  worthwhile  on  date  T -  2, 
given  the depreciation  expectations  e*(T -  1) -  e*(T -  2). If devaluation 
is worthwhile  on  date T -  2, then  it will occur no later than that date. 
And  so on,  through  the familiar backward induction,  until we  find the 
first date on which  an expected  devaluation  makes sense  for the govern- 
ment.  This is the uniquely  determined  date of the breakdown. 
This  model  misses  much  of  the  action  in  my  view.  A  key  point  of 
the  new  crisis literature is that the  shadow-exchange-rate  path e*(t) it- 
self,  rather than  being  exogenously  given,  is likely  to depend  on  past 
exchange-rate  expectations.  In other words,  what  people  expected  yes- 
terday about  today's  exchange  rate is likely to affect the exchange  rate 
the  authorities  would  choose  if  their  hands  were  untied  today.  The 
"fundamentals"  are endogenous.  Krugman's appendix  makes this clear, 
for  we  see  there  that  the  desired  exchange  rate e* depends  on  such 
potentially  endogenous  variables  as  the  price level,  the  inflation  rate, 
and  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment,  not  to  mention  others  that  a 
broader model  might contain. 
For example,  if labor unions  expect a date-t devaluation  on date t -  1, 
they  demand  high  nominal  wages  then,  creating a real appreciation  on 
date t and raising the date-t nominal  exchange  rate consistent  with  full 
employment.  High nominal interest rates on date t -  1 raise the interest 
burden of the public debt on date t, raising the tax base for debt devalua- 
tion  through  a higher  exchange  rate. If high  nominal  interest  rates on 
date t -  1 raise unemployment  then,  and unemployment  is persistent, 
we  get a similar effect.  Some  of these  endogenous  fundamentals  move 
somewhat  slowly,  but even  a gradual buildup  of pressures  generated  by 
realignment  fears can create economic  conditions  in which a sudden  rise 
in interest  rates is more likely  to push  the government  into  devaluing. 
To summarize,  Krugman's  schedule  of shadow  exchange  rates is un- 398 *  OBSTFELD 
likely itself to be uniquely  determined,  and this reintroduces  the possi- 
bility  of  multiple  equilibria  even  when  the  fundamentals  contain  an 
underlying  trend. At the very least, one must be skeptical of the implicit 
claim that the model  presented  in the paper has any generality. 
Krugman's  discussion  of Soroi and similar gnomes  touches  on an im- 
portant area for future research. Certainly we have examples  in which  a 
Soros or a Henry Kaufman is said to have moved  exchange rates or inter- 
est rates through  the mere force of public utterance.  Krugman seems  to 
believe  that this  type  of market power  might  resolve  multiplicities  that 
arise in the absence  of trends. 
While much further work on the subject clearly is warranted, I doubt it 
will lead us to the conclusion  that all-powerful  Soroi can restore unique- 
ness  of  equilibrium.  Soros  loses  as  well  as  wins.  If  he  makes  su- 
pernormal profits,  there is free entry into the market for Soroi. Financial 
gurus  do come and go. 
Most  importantly,  a  large  Soros  with  the  financial  firepower  and 
sunspot-creating  powers  Krugman imagines  would  have  an irresistible 
temptation to deceive the public for his own enrichment. In the absence of 
better  targets,  he  might  provoke  a crisis against  a tough  government, 
pushing  up Austrian interest rates, say, and then covertly supporting the 
schilling by buying up discounted  schilling debt. Before interest rates had 
gotten too  high, he could simply announce that the Austrian government's 
defenses  had  turned  out  to be impenetrable.  Traders thus  would  have 
good reason to be wary of the Soros's pronouncements.3 Moreover, even if 
Krugman's hypothesis  were right, self-fulfilling attacks would  remain. 
4.  What  Is the  Evidence,  and  What  Are  the 
Policy  Implications? 
The statistical literature on crises illustrates a point that Krugman rightly 
emphasizes.  In an uncertain world, it is inherently difficult if not impossi- 
ble  to  isolate  empirically  any  unambiguously  self-fulfilling  element  in 
currency crises. Krugman's discussion  of the EMS episodes  illustrates the 
identification  problem  once  again.  Exercising  more  care than  in  other 
parts  of  the  paper,  he  checks  two  criteria to  see  whether  the  unique- 
equilibrium  crisis model  is plausible.  First, was  the country  in difficult 
3. Benabou  and  Laroque (1992) have  formally  modeled  an asset  market in which  agents 
with privileged  information manipulate  market opinion in order to trade more profitably 
themselves.  In their dynamic model,  Benabou and Laroque show  that the credibility of a 
given  guru's  signals  goes  to  zero  asymptotically  as  a  result  of  repeated  deception. 
However,  a new  guru with  a shorter track record of deception  may take his place.  The 
model  leaves  open  the  question  of whether  the  weight  markets place on the possibly 
false  signals  of informed  traders could  be sufficient  to collapse  a major currency peg. Comment 399 
economic  straits? Second,  was there a "clearly visible deteriorating trend" 
in fundamentals? 
An  affirmative  answer  to the first question,  as I have  argued  and  as 
Krugman  implicitly  agrees  here,  doesn't  help  one  decide  between  the 
two  views  of  crises.  The  second  question,  insofar  as  it is  possible  to 
answer  it at all, isn't  really decisive  either. It is not a robust result that 
badly trending  fundamentals  eliminate multiplicities,  although  the dem- 
onstration  of such  a trend would  suggest  that a crisis was  inevitable  at 
some  point.  In any case,  how  can we clearly establish a trend in a short 
span of data? Even a temporary recession will display a clearly deteriorat- 
ing trend for a while-without  telling us what would  have happened  in 
states of the world  that did not materialize subsequently. 
It really must be up to the reader to judge whether Krugman has made 
his  case  that  for each  of  the  ERM currencies  considered,  an eventual 
crisis was  inevitable.  There is simply  no way  to prove this,  or the oppo- 
site,  conclusively-certainly  not  with  a few  anecdotes.  Herein  lies  the 
value  of  research  like  that of  Eichengreen,  Rose,  and  Wyplosz  (1995), 
which  attempts  to describe  the characteristics of crisis and devaluation 
periods  across  broad  samples  of  countries  in  a fairly systematic  way. 
Such work at least allows  us to get a feel for the characteristics common 
to crises,  and  for the  sense  in which  individual-country  circumstances 
may  differ from the  sample  average.  We cannot  draw watertight  infer- 
ences,  but we almost never can from macro time series. 
Even for the cases Krugman selects,  the facts, in my opinion,  are really 
much  more  ambiguous  than  he  makes  out.  It seems  to me  absolutely 
inconceivable  that France would  have assented  to the August  1993 wid- 
ening  of the  EMS bands  in the absence  of severe  speculative  pressure. 
Nor was  such  an adjustment  in any sense  inevitable  a bit further down 
the road.  Sure,  France had  and  continues  to have  economic  problems. 
But her government  simply has too big a long-run political stake in EMU 
to  pursue  the  transient  benefits  of  devaluation  except  under  irresist- 
ible  pressure.  President  Jacques  Chirac's  eventful  drive  to  meet  the 
Maastricht economic  criteria has shown  the strength  of the French gov- 
erning  elite's  institutional  commitment  to EMU. Interestingly,  and con- 
trary to Krugman's model of steadily deteriorating fundamentals,  France 
has not had much of a devaluation  against the DM since August  1993, as 
Figure 1 shows.  Other countries  attacked by speculators  could likewise 
have  lived  much  longer  with  their September  1992 ERM parities.  Like 
France,  Belgium  and  Denmark  have,  even  though  these  countries  also 
were  targeted  in the July 1993 attack on  the EMS. If markets expected 
policymakers  in  these  countries  to  depreciate  their currencies  sharply 
and  permanently  after  the  crisis,  why  didn't  this  happen  within  the 400 - OBSTFELD 
Figure  1 BELGIUM,  DENMARK,  AND FRANCE:  EXCHANGE  RATES 
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wider  ERM bands?  One  can always  argue that things  unexpectedly  got 
better after 1993. But that is the point.  The possibility  that things  might 
get significantly  better in a couple of quarters was always there. It isn't in 
Krugman's model  of unique  equilibrium.4 
Krugman is rather selective  in the countries he discusses.  Italy, with its 
bloated  public  debt  and  overvalued  currency, is  clearly a country  that 
was  headed  for devaluation  in  1992. That is why  its EMS partners as- 
sented  to  a realignment  which,  rather than  quelling  speculative  fires, 
stoked  them.  But Belgium's  debt is equally big, and its exchange  rate is 
not  much  changed  since  1992.  Norway  in  1992 had  a weak  banking 
4. Higher-frequency  data reveal that all three currencies in Figure 1 did depreciate tempo- 
rarily below  their July 1993 ERM floors once  the bands  were  widened  in early August. 
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system  and  sharply higher  unemployment  than a few years earlier, but 
no overvaluation  to speak  of, a current-account  surplus,  and a negative 
public  debt  that  gave  it ample  leeway  for stimulative  fiscal policies.  It 
weathered  the storms of the early fall of 1992, but finally caved in Decem- 
ber, despite  OECD forecasts  that its economy  was  poised  for recovery. 
One important prediction of a realistic stochastic version of Krugman's 
model is that nominal interest rates should  rise on average as fundamen- 
tals deteriorate prior to a collapse.  Recall that in the model,  the exchange 
rate contingent  on  a collapse  rises  over  time  and,  with  uncertainty,  so 
must  the probability that an unexpected  bad shock pushes  the govern- 
ment  over the brink. Interest-rate parity thus predicts a generally  rising 
nominal  interest  rate  if,  indeed,  fundamentals  are random  around  a 
predictably worsening  trend. 
Krugman dismisses  the contrary evidence  that interest-rate-based mea- 
sures  of credibility  often  deteriorate  sharply  only  shortly before  (or as) 
crises get under way. Markets are myopic,  he explains,  and they simply 
ignore what is apparent to good  economists. 
If markets really are as myopic  as Krugman says,  how  can they  per- 
form the  complicated  backward  induction  Krugman would  have  them 
do to arrive at a unique  equilibrium  when  fundamentals  are deteriorat- 
ing monotonically?  Can't their myopia,  their herding tendency,  produce 
a multiplicity  of crises beyond  what  even  the new  crisis models,  which 
assume  rational expectations,  can generate?  If Krugman really believes 
this  explanation,  he  must  harbor some  misgivings  too about the hyper 
rational model  he espouses,  in which  attacks are pinned  down  because 
speculators  strike  at  the  precise  moment  for  their  collective  action  to 
eliminate  ex ante arbitrage opportunities.  Krugman fleetingly  acknowl- 
edges  this difficulty, but quickly moves  on. 
I have  suggested  elsewhere  that  the  observed  interest-rate  pattern 
could be explained  in a model with multiple equilibria. Another explana- 
tion might  simply  be the release  of a piece of news  bad enough  to push 
the  "shadow"  exchange  rate to a level  where  an attack might  succeed. 
This scenario  is consistent  with  Krugman's model  or one of mine.  Cer- 
tainly a good  deal of bad news  about the EMS, most of it political, started 
emerging  incrementally  in June 1992 after the Danes voted  their historic 
no.  (That was news.)  And  the prospect  that French voters  would  reject 
the  Maastricht  Treaty  in  the  very  September  referendum  President 
Mitterand had called to save it certainly focused  speculators' minds.  But 
the  pressure  continued  long  after the French,  however  narrowly, reaf- 
firmed the treaty (as prior poll results  suggested  they might),  and even 
after the  Danes  finally  reversed  their vote.  What was  the  big piece  of 
additional  news  that  made  the  crisis  erupt  in  September  rather than 402 *  OBSTFELD 
during,  say, July or August? It is true, as Krugman observes  that markets 
did  not  know  in  August  what  we  know  now.  But  the  relevant  and 
puzzling  point is that they didn't know  that much more in early Septem- 
ber than they  did in August. 
Finally, if the fall 1992 ERM crisis was  inevitable,  why  were countries 
ostensibly  in  very  similar predicaments  to Italy, France,  or the  United 
Kingdom,  notably  Belgium  and Denmark,  not assaulted  seriously  until 
the following  year? 
If you  agree  that  Krugman  has  proved  his  case  after reading  this 
paper, you  may not have noticed  that he has actually proved  too much. 
For what  he comes  close  to arguing at several points  is that virtually any 
time a country has gotten  into balance-of- payments  difficulties recently, 
there was no way out short of a devaluation.  In any case we can think of, 
the  fundamentals  were  following  a predictable  downward  trend.  This 
position  denies  that destabilizing  speculation  can often be a problem in 
and  of itself  for countries  encountering  temporary difficulties.  In other 
words,  there are no true liquidity problems,  only solvency  problems.  In 
the terminology  of the International Monetary Fund's Articles of Agree- 
ment,  any  disequilibrium  is  a  fundamental  disequilibrium.  If  this  is 
Krugman's  view,  the  policy  implications  seem  just  as  extreme  as  the 
conclusions  he alleges  believers  in self-fulfilling  crises have drawn. 
The  middle  ground  of  temporary  balance-of-payments  difficulties  is 
precisely  the one we worry about when  we discuss big questions  like the 
stability  of fixed-exchange-rate  systems.  Krugman's  own  analysis  con- 
firms that in this gray area, multiple equilibria are possible.  So I think he 
has basically ceded  the ground  to those  who worry about the stability of 
fixed rates in a world with high capital mobility and stochastic economic 
luck. 
In cases  with  trending  fundamentals  we  know  the  answer,  which  is 
that countries  that cannot  keep  their fundamentals  off of unsustainable 
trends  had  best  avoid  fixed  rates.  We knew  this long  before  Krugman 
showed  us his elegant  model  of how  and when  such countries'  curren- 
cies would  collapse.  Krugman has shown  here,  very usefully,  a way  to 
extend  his  earlier work  to a setting  with  purposeful  government  deci- 
sions.  In doing  so,  he has demonstrated  mainly that the new  approach 
to crises can encompass  a strictly broader range of phenomena  than the 
earlier paradigm  could. 
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They  may even  be wrong  about future government  policy, for example 
because  of government  misdirection  or lack of credibility of government 
announcements.  In any case, the data will not distinguish  between  these 
two classes  of models  or their alternative implications about the origin of 
the speculative  attack. 
In spite of this observational  equivalence,  there has been a strong push 
to embrace the multiple-equilibrium  models-on  the basis of evidence-as 
key to understanding  the two recent, intellectually  galvanizing  exchange 
crises, the attacks on the ERM  in 1992-1993 and the Mexican peso in 1994. 
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models.  As usual,  it is expedient  for the official sector to put the blame on 
destabilizing  speculators  rather than on destabilizing  policies. 
In the  EMS episode,  a sequence  of attacks on  country  after country 
(resulting  in  either  devaluation  or departure  from  the  system)  culmi- 
nated  in an abortive attack on the French franc. The subsequent  attacks 
on the franc in the summer  of 1993 led to a large widening  of the band. 
While it is generally  conceded  that the attacks on the lira and the pound 
sterling  were  justified  on  the  basis  of  fundamentals,  the  French were 
particularly miffed  because  they  had viewed  themselves  as being  even 
tougher  than  the  Germans  in their adherence  to the  exchange-rate  re- 
gime.  Moreover,  the attacks and the unraveling  of the EMS were viewed 
as a threat to the overarching political  goal of monetary unification.  Thus 
was  born  the  view  that  speculators  had  independently  undermined  a 
fundamentally  sound  policy  trajectory, an  interpretation  that  allowed 
officials to avoid  the conclusion  that the decade's  grand monetary  strat- 
egy might be fundamentally  flawed. 
Complicated  as the sequential  attacks on the EMS were,  however,  it is 
easy  to  fit  the  collapse  into  the  framework  of  the  single-equilibrium 
speculative-attack  model.  The attacks were not directed so much at this 
or that weak-currency  country's reserves.  Rather, they were everywhere 
and  always  attacks on  the  Bundesbank's  willingness  to acquire foreign 
exchange  claims against its partners and expand  its own  balance sheet. 
Technical limits existed  on the Bundesbank's  ability to sterilize its huge 
acquisitions  of foreign  exchange,  and this threatened  its monetary  con- 
trol policy.  Also,  the  Bundesbank  ran the  risk of large,  and  politically 
threatening,  capital losses  if devaluations  occurred in spite  of interven- 
tion.  Taken together,  these  constraints  placed  a practical ceiling  on the 
credit that would  be  extended  to the  weak-currency  central banks,  re- 
gardless  of the Basle-Nyborg  provisions  for "unlimited" strong-central- 
bank lending.  This ceiling  set the Bundesbank  up for a selling  attack by 
speculators'  acquiring DM for foreign exchange.  Alternatively  stated,  it 
placed  a limit on  the  negative  net reserve  position  that weak-currency 
central banks could attain in defending  their exchange  rate. 
In standard attack models  the floor on the net reserve position  is a key 
determinant  of the  timing  of an attack-the  higher  the floor value,  the 
more imminent  is an attack. The floor value is not observable,  but must 
be guessed  by  speculators.  In the  sequence  of attacks starting in Italy, 
information  was gradually revealed about the floor value for net reserves 
that could  be attained  through  access  to Bundesbank  credit.  While the 
Bundesbank  never  explicitly  stopped  lending,  it let it be known  to the 
central banks that limits were being reached. As Bundesbank limits were 
reached  country  by country, and as the sequence  of attacks pushed  the Comment  405 
Bundesbank  closer to its own  overall limit, speculators  gained  informa- 
tion  and  revised  upward  their beliefs  about  the  floor on  net  reserves 
available  to  the  next  country.  Naturally,  France was  tested  when  the 
evidence  generated  by  the  lira and  pound-sterling  devaluations  indi- 
cated that the Bundesbank  might be near its lending  limit. In the event, 
the Bundesbank  gave  the French franc unstinting  support; however,  to 
enhance  its defense  of the franc, it also forced a monetary tightening  on 
the French and  subsequently  even  lowered  its own  interest  rates. That 
the Bundesbank  would  take these  actions would  not have been obvious 
ex ante to the markets. 
The Mexican episode  was interpreted almost instantly as another case 
of  a bad  equilibrium  imposed  by  foreign  speculators  on  an  otherwise 
sound  Mexico.  This interpretation  was  first circulated by the U.S.  Trea- 
sury and echoed  by the IMF, but it was immediately  picked up by those 
embracing  the  multiple-equilibrium  theories.  Again  the  decision  to 
adopt  the multiple-equilibrium  explanation  has an entirely political ba- 
sis. President  Clinton was placed in the embarrassing position  of having 
praised  the Mexican economic  program,  and pushing  it as a model  for 
other emerging-market  countries,  just weeks  before the collapse  of the 
peso.  When,  for justifiable strategic political and economic  reasons,  the 
Treasury shortly  thereafter proposed  a bailout,  it could  only have been 
packaged  in  the  context  of  a liquidity  problem  rather than  a solvency 
problem.  How  else  to explain  why  the Administration  had been  so far 
off the mark in its recent public assessment  of Mexico? 
Nevertheless,  the notion  that the triggering disturbance emanated  au- 
tonomously  from  the  world  financial  system  is  a myth,  based  on  no 
supporting  evidence.  The run on  the peso  was  not  sparked by the 25- 
year-old  "green-screen  brigade" in New  York, nor by panicked  country 
fund  managers,  nor by a front-running  Soros. Daily depository  data on 
holdings  of Mexican  government  securities  and equities  by foreign  ad- 
dresses  show  few negative  movements  in positions  in the months before 
and even  in the months  after the collapse  of the peso.  The attack on the 
peso  came from the large Mexican banks and other well-placed  insiders, 
exactly the players  that we  might  expect  to move  on the basis of inside 
information  on  fundamentals.  Thus  the Mexican episode  provides  not 
even  superficial evidence  in favor of multiple-equilibrium  models;  quite 
the contrary. It is amazing  that this experience  has been used  as a major 
empirical  prop  for this  view.  Even  the  argument  that the  bailout  was 
necessary  to prevent  worldwide  contagion  does not wash.  It was natural 
for the markets,  having  been burned in Mexico and forcefully informed 
that  their  knowledge  base  was  not  as  good  as  they  thought,  to  test 
Mexico-like  capital importers.  Most  passed  the test (with Argentina  an 406 *  DISCUSSION 
important  exception)  by  showing  themselves  willing  to impose  short- 
lived  liquidity  squeezes.  They were  then left alone by markets satisfied 
that the  fundamentals  were  sound.  But it was  not  the  emergence  of a 
large-scale  lender  of  last resort that chased  off this  speculative  horde. 
That  lender  had  already  fired  off  all  its  liquidity  ammunition  in  the 
Mexican intervention. 
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Discussion 
Because of time constraints,  the general discussion  was brief. The princi- 
pal contribution  from the  floor was  by Peter Garber. Garber's remarks 
are printed  separately above. 
Paul Krugman made some  general responses  to the discussants.  With 
respect  to  questions  raised  about  the  details  of  his  model,  Krugman 
noted  that  there  is  always  a tension  between  using  simple,  reduced- 
form  models  and  more  elaborate  structural  models-the  former  are 
more tractable and may capture a broader class of phenomena,  while the 
latter have the virtues of specificity and explicitness.  Krugman felt that it 
was unlikely  that changes  in modeling  details would  overturn the quali- 
tative conclusions  of his paper. 
With respect to Maurice Obstfeld's contention  that Krugman's version 
of the multiple-equilibrium  approach was a "straw man," Krugman dif- 
ferentiated between  the model as formally analyzed  and the model used 
as a basis for broader political and economic  discussions.  Krugman said 
that he had been  motivated  to write the paper after hearing claims that 
any  fixed  exchange  rate, no matter how  responsible  the policies  of the 
government,  was  subject  to  a  speculative  attack.  He  felt  that  it  was 
important  to clarify that the  range of fundamentals  for which  multiple 
equilibria are possible  may be much narrower than commonly  thought. 
On the  possibility  of differentiating  the two  types  of models  empiri- 
cally, Krugman  attributed  to Jeff Frankel the  remark that the  secret  of 
empirical work is to define your hypothesis  so that failure to find signifi- 
cant results  can be interpreted  as support.  He  thought  that both  sides 
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had implicitly  adopted  the Frankel strategy; in particular, the relatively 
modest  deterioration  of fundamentals  observed  in many recent cases of 
speculative  attack could be interpreted either as supporting  or as contra- 
dicting  the  multiple-equilibrium  story, depending  on  how  the  null  hy- 
pothesis  was phrased.  He noted that, in particular, although  the absence 
of a dramatic event  preceding  a speculative  run might seem  to indicate 
multiple  equilibria,  his  1979 model  in which  crises arise through  a pro- 
cess  of backward  induction  does  not rely on the arrival of bad news  to 
spark the attack either. 